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This article examines the tension between two antithetical crim-
inal law doctrines: the felony murder rule of ancient, though dis-
puted, lineage,' and the modern jurisprudence of capital punish-
ment under the eighth amendment, which the Supreme Court has
created over the past two decades. A tension has developed between
these two doctrines because they are, fundamentally, polar oppo-
sites. On the one hand, the felony murder rule, in its starkest form,
provides that any participant in a specified felony that results in a
death shall be punished as a murderer, no matter how accidental
or unforeseeable the death, nor how attenuated the defendant's
connection to the death. 2 As such, the rule long has been criticized
as a singular exception to the normal principles of criminal law,
which require that liability for a particular offense be predicated
I One commentator traces the origin of the felony murder rule back to Roman law.
Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of ()them 105 U. PA. C. Rev. 50, 58 n. 43
(1956). More commonly, the rule is considered to have originated either in it sixteenth century
homicide case Or in a misinterpretation by Lord Coke of an earlier treatise on homicide. Id.
at 58; Roth & Sundby, The Felony -Murder Rule: A Doctrine nt Constitutional Crossroads, 70
CORNELL. L. Rev. 446, 449 and nn. 17-20 (1985). The history or the rule in America is
sketched briefly in the commentary to the Model Penal Code. Momq, PENAL CODE § 210.2
comment 6 (1980).
"The classic formulation of the felony-murder doctrine declares that one is guilty of
murder if a death results from conduct during the commission or attempted commission of
any felony." MODEL. PENAL CODE; § 210.2 comment 6 (1980). The rule operates to hold the
accused liable fir; murder if the killing is connected in any way either with the attempt to
commit a felony or to flee from the scene of a felony. It does not matter whether the killing
occurs accidentally or non-negligently. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony -Murder, 12 Ste'. U.L. Rev.
413 (1981). In its most extreme forms, the rule has been extended to impose liability on
felons for deaths caused by third parties. such as the intended victim, the police. or a
bystander, Id. at 422-23: see also infra notes 33, 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
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on the individual defendant's menc rea and degree of participation
in the specific offense charged.'
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence
of death is based on a heightened refinement, not an exception, to
these principles. This refinement requires an even more searching
inquiry into all of the relevant aspects of the crime and the defen-
dant than usually is found in criminal law to ensure the reliability
and correctness of the decision to impose death.
The purpose of this Article is not to rehash the many criticisms
of the felony murder rule. Rather, this Article will focus on the
difficulties engendered by the continued use of the rule, in one
form or the other, in those states that. impose the death penalty; on
the attempts made by the Supreme Court to ameliorate the harsh-
ness of the Mony murder rule as it. applies to felony accomplices
in capital cases; and on additional but as yet unexplored ways to
analyze the norms of the eighth amendment in the felony murder
context.
In Part II, the Article will identify briefly the fundamental
themes of eighth amendment capital punishment jurisprudence:
the underlying quest to limit the death penalty to only the most
deserving offenders, and the Supreme Court's primary reliance on
procedural rules to ensure reliability in the determination that death
be imposed. Part. III will discuss the inevitable disproportionality
and racial impact arising from the decision by most states to retain
3 According to the usual principles of the criminal law, conduct combined with stale of
mind produces a measure of culpability, with lesser culpability yielding lesser liability, As
Professor Hall states, the usual rule is that "(elitch crime . has its distinctive wens rea." J.
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 142 (2d ed. 1960).
Professor Sayre describes the entire evolution of the common law in the criminal area
as primarily a move towards a particularized mots rea requirement firr each crime. Sayre,
Moo Rea. 95 HARe, L. REv. 974, 994, 1019 (1932). The Model Penal Code carries this
evolution one step further by requiring a particular wens rea for each material element of
the offense. MonEL PENAL. Cone § 2.02 (1985). See generally Robinson and Grall, Element
Analysis. in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Sr.AN L. Rev. 681
(1983). One who has no blameworthy omens rea, such as an accidental, non-negligent killer, is
guilty of no crime at all unless the felony murder rule or its junior league variation, the
misdemeanor manslaughter rule, is applied.
It takes little analysis to see why taFave & Scott describe the felony murder rule, which
allows conviction for even the highest degree of murder not on any proven culpability with
respect to homicide but solely on liability for another crime. as a "striking exception" to the
usual principles of criminal liability. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. Semi., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
6.8(b), at ISO (1986). The drafters of the Model Penal Code agree, noting that "Itihis
doctrine aside. the criminal law does not predicate hability simply on conduct causing the
death of another" and the Iplrincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is
hard to find." Muuei . PENAL. COM. § 210.2 comment CI (1980).
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the felony murder rule in their first degree murder statutes. Part
IV will examine the eighth amendment requirement that the states
narrow the class of death-eligible murder defendants. It will explore
the all too common use of the felony murder rule as a narrowing
device and will demonstrate that the felony murder rule is partic-
ularly inadequate to fulfill this constitutionally mandated function.
Part V will analyze the eighth amendment prohibition against_
gross disproportionality in sentencing, capital and non-capital, and
will discuss the Supreme Court's use of bright-line categorical rules
of disproportionality in capital cases. Part VI will demonstrate that
the Court has retreated from its efforts in the felony murder area
to construct such a categorical rule, a rule based upon the mens rea
of a felony murder accomplice. Part VI also will show that this
retreat. has undermined federal review and has left many, if not all,
minimally culpable defendants unprotected by any categorical rule
of exclusion. Finally, Part VII will discuss the necessity of developing
a jurisprudence of case-specific proportionality review in felony
murder capital cases in order to ensure that the dictates of the
eighth amendment are met.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT—
RATIONALIZING DEATH
It is no easy task to recount. briefly the United States Supreme
Court's venture into creating a new substantive and procedural
jurisprudence of death. Perhaps the simplest way to understand it
is to go back to the source—the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,''
in which a majority of Justices held that the existing systems of
capital punishment were constitutionally deficient. The Supreme
Court's activity in death penalty cases since Furman can be viewed
as an attempt to create an American system of capital punishment
that would provide a more rational basis for choosing those to be
executed than the systems the Justices examined in Furman. The
Justices in Furman were neither concerned with the individual cases
-1
 408 U.S 238 (1972) (per curiam). The per curiam decision held simply that the death
penalty as imposed in Furman and its companion cases constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth antendments. Id. at 239-40. Although
agreeing that the system of capital punishment then used by the states was unconstitutional,
the live justice majority differed considerably on why this was so, as evidenced by the five
separate concurring opinions. See, infra notes 8–l0 and accompanying text.
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before them nor with the particular idiosyncrasies of the state pro-
cedures that produced the specific death penalties. Instead, their
concerns were more global, and their opinions reflected a condem-
nation of the nationwide system for imposing the death penalty.
The pre -Furman state capital sentencing statutes in the various
states were markedly similar. In murder cases, the defendant was
made eligible for capital punishment by the substantive law of hom-
icide.' Most commonly, this eligibility meant that. the jury had found
the defendant guilty of first degree murder either because he or
she killed with premeditation and deliberation, by operation of the
felony murder rule, or, in rare cases, by use of a specified means,
such as torture or poison." Then, the sentencer, usually as part of
Most states followed the Pennsylvania 'node!, which divides murder into degrees, with
a conviction for first degree murder required for the imposition of a death sentence. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit, 18 § 4701 (Purdue 1963), ("Whosoever is convicted of the crime of murder
in the first degree is guilty of a felony and shall he sentenced to dead] . . or to undergo
imprisonment for life . ."). See, e.g., ALA. Com: 318 (1958) ("Every person who is guilty
of murder in the first degree, shall, on conviction, suffer death, or imprisonment in the
penitentiary or lire"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1954) ("Every person guilty of murder
in the first degree shall suffer death, or confinement in the state prison I'm life ."); TEN..
CODE ANN. § 39-2405 (1955) (kw first degree murder, punishment of death or imprisonment
for life or for more than twenty years). A few states retained the common law definition of
murder, without division into degrees, and provided that all murderers were eligible for the
death penalty. See, e.g., 'GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Harrison Su pp. 1971) ("The punishment
fo r persons convicted of murder shall be death, b u t may be confinement in the penitentiary
for life 2').
6 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1954) ("All murder which is perpetrated by
means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate
arson, rape; robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 288, [sex crimes
with children under 14] is murder of the lirst degree"); PA. STAT. ANN. lit. 18 § 4701 (Purdon,
1963) (first degree murder is all murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, any
other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing or in perpetration of, or attempting
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
2402 (1955) (poison], lying in wait, willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated or in
perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any first degree Murder, arson, rape, robbery,
burglary or larceny). At least one state included some kinds of reckless homicide as first
degree murder. See ALA. CODE § 314 (1958) ("Every homicide, perpetrated by poisons, lying
in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing; or
committed in the perpetration of, or the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary, or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect
the death of any human being other than him who is killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly
dangerous to the lives of others, and evidencing a depraved mind reganlless of human life,
although without any preconceived purpose to deprive any particular person of life, is
murder in the first degree .. . ."). See also GA. Com: ANN. § 26-1002 (Harrison 1953)
("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, in the peace of the state, by a person of
sound memory and discretion, with malice aforethought, either express or implied.").
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the same proceeding, was given unfettered discretion to impose the
death penalty.'
The Justices in the majority in Furman focused on the random,
arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application of the death
penalty under these statutes. To Justice Douglas, the state systems
of capital punishment produced death penalties in a manner "preg-
nant with discrimination" against minorities and the poor.8
 Justice
White opined that he was unable to see any "meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not." 9
 To Justice Stewart, the
death penalty was so "wantonly and freakishly imposed" that re-
ceiving it was like being "struck by lightning."'"
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 318 (1958) ("at the discretion of the jury"); CAL. PENAL. CODE
§ 190 (West 1954) ("at the discretion of the jury . . . or, upon the plea of guilty, the court
shall determine"); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Harrison 1953) (life could be imposed if the
jury trying the case so recommended, or, if founded solely on circumstantial evidence, the
presiding judge could sentence to life at his discretion); PA. SLAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 4701 (Purdon
1963) ("at the discretion of the jury trying the case"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2406 (1955) (duty
of jury to fix punishment which shall be death; jury may, if they are of the opinion that there
are mitigating circumstances, fix punishment at life imprisonment or for some period over
20 years).
" Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas found that unfet-
tered discretion in application of the death penalty amounted to de facia discrimination. Such
discretion allowed the penalty to be "selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the
accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a
suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more
protected position." Id. at 255. Justice Douglas compared the existing capital punishment
procedure to ancient methods of de fore discrimination in punishment, believing that pre-
Furman procedures achieved the same result "partially as a result of making the death penalty
discretionary and partially as a result of the ability of the rich to purchase the services of the
most respected and most resourceful legal talent in the Nation." Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice White acknowledged that he could not prove
his conclusion about the administration of the death penalty from the available data. Thus.
his opinion was based "on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances
of' hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which
death is the authorized penalty." Id. His major' concern was that because the death penalty
was imposed so infrequently, it could not achieve any legitimate penological purpose. Id.
'D Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Although Justice Stewart acknowledged Justice
White's opinion, which focused primarily on the infrequency of the imposition of the death
penalty, Justice Stewart was disturbed primarily by the lack of rational basis for determining
the few who were selected to die. Id. This difference is reflected in the positions the two
Justices took when the constitutionality of the death penalty was again before the Court in
1976. Justice White found his concerns with infrequency of imposition satisfied by either a
mandatory death penalty statute or one which provided standards to guide the sentencer.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 359-63 (1976) (White, J., dissenting from holding that
mandatory death penalty statute violates the eighth amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
152, 226 (1976) (Whited., concurring in judgment that guided-discretion capital punishment
statute is constitutionally acceptable). Conversely, Justice Stewart, although finding that a
capital statute, which provided standards to guide the sentencer, potentially cured the prob-
September 1990)
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The states reacted to Furman by passing statutes designed to
meet the objections of Justices Stewart, White, and Douglas. Four
years after deciding Furman, the Court upheld the death penalty
for deliberate murder, optimistically predicting that capital punish-
ment systems providing some guidance to the sentencer would ef-
fectively end, or at least minimize, the evils identified in Furman.'
Having made this prediction, the Court, in a series of cases over
the past fourteen years, has sought to guide the states in developing
capital punishment systems that reduce, if' not eliminate, discrimi-
nation, arbitrariness, and capriciousness in the selection of those to
be executed.
At one time, it appeared that the Court was trying to achieve
rationality in the process of selecting those to be spared as well as
those to be executed—Furman seemed to demand as much.' 2 The
Court, however, has essentially abandoned the former effort, hold-
ing that the eighth amendment is little concerned with consistency
in sparing a life. 13 The focus instead has been on the process of
lents of arbitrariness and capriciousness under the pre-Furman system, was unwilling to
approve a mandatory system of capital punishment, even though this undoubtedly would
assure more frequent use of the death penalty. Id. at 206-07 (plurality opinion).
The two remaining concurring opinions were authored by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, who held that the death penalty, under any and all circumstances, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment and thus violated the eighth amendment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305-
06 (Brennan, J., concurring), '370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also infra note 26 and
accompanying text. Because no other Justices joined in their broad condemnation of capital
punishment, Justices Brennan's mid Marshall's opinions in Furman have been less important
in the development of capital punishment law than those written by their concurring breth-
ren.
11 Gregg, 4'28 U.S. at 169-87 (plurality opinion) (holding death penalty not invariably
disproportionate under the eighth amendment in a case of deliberate mur(ler). The Conn
handed down decisions in five death penalty cases on July 2, 1976. After rejecting the frontal
challenge to the death penalty in Gregg, the Court upheld capital punishment statutes in
Georgia, Florida, and Texas, which provided sentencers with some degree of guidance in
making the life/death decision. See Proflitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976). At the same time, the Court invalidated the mandatory capital statutes
of North Carolina and Louisiana. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). For detailed discussions of the 1976
cases, see Liebman and Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate":
Mental Disorder As A Mitigating Factor, 66 Ow. L.J. 757, 757-89 (1978); Murchinson, Toward
a Perspective on the Death Penalty Cases, 27 Emouv L.J. 469, 491-508 (1978); The Supreme Court,
1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 63-79 (1976).
12 The plurality opinion in Gregg described Furman as holding that ''where discretion is
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human
life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited." Gregg,
428 U.S. at 189 (emphasis added).
" McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1987) (holding that defendant has no
eighth amendment claim based on juries' decisions to impose life sentence in other cases).
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selecting those to be killed, with the overarching goal of ensuring
that those defendants chosen for execution be in some way worse,
or "materially more depraved,"" than those other first degree mur-
derers not executed.
The Court has relied primarily on procedural protections to
realize its eighth amendment goals. A state first must narrow the
class of homicide defendants who are eligible for the death penalty
to ensure that even if some "materially more depraved" murderers
manage to avoid the death penalty, those chosen for this dubious
honor will at least be among the worst offenders.''
This narrowing, however, is insufficient by itself to satisfy the
eighth amendment. The Court has prohibited a mandatory death
penalty for even the narrowest class of murder defendants."' In-
stead, after restricting the class of death-eligible defendants, a state
must utilize additional procedures that assure "reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment" in a given
capital case. 17
To meet this reliability requirement, a state must permit the
sentencer to make "an individualized determination on the basis of
the character of the individual and the circumstances of the
crime." 18
 The defendant is entitled to present and have the senten-
' 4 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of this
narrowing requirement.
," In Sumner v. Shuman, the Court held that a mandatory death sentence was unconsti-
tutional even for prisoners who kill while under sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, thus answering a question reserved in earlier cases. 483 U.S. 66, 77-78
(1987). See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n. 11 (1978) ( - We express no opinion as to
whether the need to deter certain kinds of homicide would justify a mandatory death sentence
as, for example, when a prisoner—or escapee—under a life sentence is found guilty of
murder."). See also Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977) (invalidating
mandatory death penalty for intentional killing of police officer engaged in performance
lawful duties).
' 7
 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280. 305 (1976). The Woodson plurality opinion
of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens based the reliability requirement on the premise that
the death penalty is fundamentally different from a sentence of imprisonment. They rea-
soned that, "Ibiecause of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in
the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case." Id. This need for heightened reliability has become, at least rhetorically, part
of the Court's eighth amendment law. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988)
(Stevens, J.); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1083) (emphasis in opinion). The requirement
for an individualized consideration in every capital case First was mentioned in justice Powell's
plurality opinion in Woodson:
A process that accords no signifkance to relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense
September 1990]
	 JURISPRUDENCE OF DEATH
cer fully consider all relevant evidence in mitigation of sentence.'"
The state also is allowed, but not required, to present a wide range
of evidence in aggravation as long as it is relevant to the sentencing
decision and promotes the reliability of that determination. 2"
In theory, both the restriction of discretion attendant upon the
narrowing requirement and the increase in discretion caused by the
full and unlettered consideration of mitigation serve the underlying
goal of winnowing out those who do not convincingly deserve the
death penalty. Some defendants avoid the sanction of death because
the characteristics of their crimes or backgrounds do not provide
excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties ()I' humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as niembers of a faceless, undif-
ferentiated mass to he subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.
428 U.S. at 304 (plurality
15 In Lockett v. Ohio, Justice Burger's plurality opinion held that the individualized
consideration mandated by Woodson required that the scntencer "not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
that death." 438 U.S. 586. 604 (1978) (emphasis in opinion). A majority of the Court adopted
the Lockett holding in Eddings in. Oklahoma, which held that a semencer must not only listen
to mitigating evidence, but must consider it in determining whether death is the appropriate
punishment.. 455 U.S. 104, 110, 117 (1982).
Since Lockett, the Supreme Court consistently has prohibited the states front interfering
in any way with the sentencer's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Penry
v, Lynauglt, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2958 (1989) (Texas sentencing statute failed to allow sentences
to consider evidence or defendant's mental retardation); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,
384 (1988) (requirement for unanimous finding of mitigating circumstances found uncon-
stitutional); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987) (striking down death sentence
because neither jury nor judge considered nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (invalidating death sentence because jury was not
allowed to consider relevant mitigating evidence); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979)
(evidentiary rule precluded presentation of mitigating evidence); cf. Walton v. Arizona, 110
S. Ct. 3047 (1990) (permissible for state to place burden of proving mitigating circumstances
on defendant); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182, (1988) (mitigating evidence fully
considered by jury); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (holding constitutional
an instruction telling jury not to base sentence On "mete sympathy").
L2 ' } COMPail? South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2211 (1989) (forbidding prose-
cution use of victim impact evidence) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S, 496, 509 (1987) (same)
and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 339-40 (1985) (improper to misinform jury about
availability of appellate review of decision) with Califlinsia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013
(1983) (permissible to inform jury t hat governor can commute sentence of life without parole
to imprisonment for icons of years) and Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983) (not
constitutional error for sentencer to consider relevant evidence not admissible under state
law) and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 905-06 (1983) (psychiatric testimony regarding
defendant's future dangerousness admissible) and Zan' v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890-91
(1983) (invalidity of aggravating circumstance found by jury harmless so long as evidence
admitted in support of circumstance relevant to sentencing decision).
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enough aggravation to distinguish them from all of the other mur-
derers. Others avoid the death penalty because the unique charac-
teristics of their crimes or backgrounds raise mitigating factors that
separate them from the truly worst of the worst.
In addition to relying on procedural dictates, the Court has
used sparingly the concept of disproportionality under the eighth
amendment to rule out the death penalty for entire classes of of-
fenders. Such classes include those who cause great harm but do
not participate at all in the taking of human life; 2 ' those who kill
but are below a minimum age; 22 those who become insane after
trial; 23
 and those who, as felony murder accomplices, lack a mini-
mum level of culpability regarding a killing. 24 Under these holdings,
a defendant can be ineligible for execution, no matter how aggra-
vated the case, if a single factor, i.e., a requisite degree of harm or
culpability, is absent.
The extended effort by the Court to rationalize the imposition
of death has been criticized harshly, even from within the Court.
Justice Harlan, writing in McCautha v. California the year before
Furman, warned that any attempt to rationalize the imposition of
capital punishment was a task "beyond human ability," and that the
federal courts, therefore, should allow the states the freedom to
choose how to impose this ultimate penalty. 25 Justices Marshall and
Brennan have concluded that capital punishment never can be
imposed in a manner consistent. with the demands of the eighth
amendment. 2" Other Justices have expressed doubts about the con-
2 ' Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, (300 (1977).
22
 Thompson v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (prohibiting imposition of death
penalty when defendant was under the age of 16 at the tune the offense was committed).
But cf. Stanford v. Kentucky l09 S. Ct. 2969. 2980 (1989) (capital punishment may be imposed
when defendant was 16 or 17 years old at the time the offense was committed).
23 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986),
2,
 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800—
0 I (1982). See infra notes 128-61 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of
these cases.
2i McUautlia v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). In McGautha, the Court rejected a
due process challenge to capital punishment that was virtually identical to the eighth amend-
ment challenge accepted the following year in Furman. Id. at 196.
2' Justices Brennan and Marshall initially set forth their opposition to the death penalty
in their concurring opinions in Furman. 408 U.S. 238, 257, 314 (1972). Justice Brennan based
his opposition to capital punishment on its inconsistency with the four principles found in
the eighth amendment: that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the
dignity of human beings; that a state must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment; that a
severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society; and that it must not
be excessive. He held the death penalty to be inconsistent with all four principles. Id. at 281-
305 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall analyzed the history or the death penalty to
conclude that it no longer comports with evolving standards of decency. Id. at 314 - 42
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stitutionality of the capital punishment systems now being used by
the states but have been unwilling to conclude that the venture is
hopeless. 27
By shifting majorities, the Court has steered a path between
the extremes. Keeping the goal of minimizing arbitrariness, caprice,
and discrimination in Front of them, the Justices have scrutinized
various state procedures, approving some and disallowing others.
Although rarely achieving unanimity on the result in any particular
case, the Court seemingly has reached agreement on the questions
to be asked in each case—questions relating to the evils identified
in Furman, and the consequent need to limit the death penalty to
the truly deserving.
III. FELONY MURDER IN THE AGE OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW
In its requirements for narrowing and individualization, as well'
as in its overall goal of restricting the reach of the death penalty to
the most deserving offenders, the eighth amendment superstruc-
(Marshall, J., concurring). Both Brennan and Marshall dissented in Gregg, making it clear
that they believed that imposition of . the death penalty was a per se violation of the eighth
amendment. 428 U.S. 153, 230-31, 240-41 (1976). Both Justices consistently have maintained
this position since Gregg, referring to the Gregg dissent in every case in which a death sentence
has been affirmed or certiorari to a capital case denied. For a more complete discussio n of
the views held by Justices Brennan and Marshall, see Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death
Penalty and the Constitution, 85 Mum. L. Rcv. 1741, 1752-57, 1765-72, 1792, 1800-03 (1987).
In his analysis of the Court's eighth amendment capital jurisprudence, Professor Burt
concludes that:
[al current Supreme Crwl intijority clearly has resolved to abandon the enter.
prise of scrutinizing the administration of the death penalty. The disorder, the
cacophony, in the Court's own prior deliberative process, however, makes it
difficult to see whether this abandonment comes because the rationalizing en-
terprise has failed or because it was never seriously attempted.
Id. at 1818-19. See also Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE 14 908, 928
(1982) (concluding that an attempt to introduce evenhandedness into capital punishment
system is doomed to failure): Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sur'. Cr. Rev. 305, 393-95
(criticizing death penalty decisions); Note, MeCleshey u. Kemp: The Supreme Court Pulls the Switch
on Future judicial Challenges to the Death Penalty, 221 MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 227-32 (1988)
(same).
' This view seems hest to describe the position of Justices Stevens and Blackmun. F4 it
instance, in McCleskey a. Kemp, Just ices Blackmun and Stevens join Justice Bretman's dissent-
ing opinion which argues that the race of victim disparity evident in Georgia capital sen-
tencing violates the eighth amendment. 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
They do not, however, join Brennall'S standard "death is always unconstitutional" portion of
this dissent. instead, they argue, in it separate dissent, that even if the statistical evidence or
racial prejudice was accepted as true, the problem could he remedied by limiting imposition
of the death penalty to "certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors
consistently seek, and juries consistently impose, the death penalty without regard to the race
of the victim or the race of the offender." Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ture that the Court has constructed mirrors the development of the
common law of homicide, at least in regard to non-felony murder.
The early development of the concept of malice as a dividing line
between manslaughter and murder, and the later division of mur-
der into degrees were both attempts to narrow the class of homicide
defendants eligible for the death penalty. 28 Similarly, the shift in
the twentieth century from mandatory to discretionary death pen-
alties reflected a consensus in favor of individualized consideration
of the character of the offender and the circumstances of the of-
fense. 29
Furman was a declaration that these earlier efforts were insuf-
ficient to satisfy the eighth amendment. As subsequent decisions
made clear, the Court would require both further narrowing and
more intensely focused individualized considerations in an attempt
to avoid the problems identified in Furman. In non-felony murder
cases, this added refinement and order offers some assurance, how-
ever incomplete, that the death penalty will be reserved for the
more culpable homicide defendants. This is because both the fur-
ther narrowing of the class and the intense individualized scrutiny
are applied to a class of' offenders from which the least culpable
homicide defendants already have been eliminated from eligibility
for the death penalty. Both those who kill accidentally, without
malice or without premeditation and deliberation, and those who
do not participate in the killing sufficiently to be aiders and abettors
under the usual norms of the criminal law are already ineligible for
the death penalty, even before the procedures required by the Court
are brought to bear. In short, non-felony murder capital defendants
are afforded two levels of individualized scrutiny. The first level
arises when the jury determines the defendant's culpability for first
degree, or capital, murder, and the second level occurs when the
2" For a brief history of the development or Anglo-Saxon homicide law, see Moiwi.
PENAL CODE § 210.2 comments 1 and 2 (1980). The development of malice and the lesser
crime of manslaughter as a way to narrow the class of homicide defendants subject to the
death penalty occurred early at ccinuncin law. The further narrowing by dividing murder
into degrees was initiated by Pennsylvania in 1799. See id. comment 2; Koenig, Capital
Punishment and Crimes of Murder, 13 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 817, 822-23 (1982); Wechsler, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 Comm. L. REV. 701, 703 (1937).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292 n. 25 (1970). Tennessee became the
first state to grant juries sentencing discretion in capital cases in 1838, followed by Alabama
in 1841, and Louisiana in 1846. By the turn of the century, 23 states and the federal
government had moved to discretionary sentencing. During the next two decades, 14 inure
states had replaced their mandatory death penalty statutes with discretionary statutes, and
by 1963, all remaining jurisdictions still authorizing the death penalty had followed suit. Id.
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sentencer, whether judge or jury, examines the case by using the
procedures required by the eighth amendment.
A. The Felony Murder Rule and the Quest for Appropriateness
The felony murder rule disrUpts this pattern of individualized
scrutiny as well as all meaningful narrowing. In Justice O'Connor's
words, felony murder is not limited to murder "as it is ordinarily
envisioned. i0 In contrast to the winnowing out of the least culpable
offenders through the application of the malice and premeditation/
deliberation standards of non-felony murder homicide law, the fe-
lony murder rule thrusts an entire undifferentiated mass of defen-
dants into the category of the supposedly worst murderers eligible
For the death penalty. Some of these defendants indeed may be
among the most culpable offenders—for example, the cold-blooded
executioner of a store clerk during a robbery—but many are not.
The rule makes no distinctions.
The felony murder rule disregards the normal rules of criminal
culpability and provides homicide liability equally for both the de-
liberate rapist/killer"' and the robber whose victim dies of a heart.
attack, as well as for the robber's accomplice who is absent from the
scene of the crime." 2 In its traditional form, still used in some
jurisdictions, the felony murder rule can make the defendant guilty
of murder when an officer or victim mistakenly kills a third person"
3 ) Et-untold v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 812 (1982) (O'Connor, j., dissenting).
'' See, e.g., State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 66-67, 673 P.2c1 I, 4-5 (1983) (en bane)
(abduction, rape, torture, and murder of hitchhiker), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984).
32 People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 209-11, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 602-03 (1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970). Two of the defendants in Stamp robbed a business, while the
third defendant, Billy Dean Lehman, remained in the car outside. During the robbery, the
defendants forced the robbery victims to lie down on the Boor and instructed them to remain
there for five minutes after they departed. About 15 or 20 minutes after the robbery, one
of the victims, the owner, collapsed and later died. His death was diagnosed as caused by a
heart attack induced by shock from the robbery. All three defendants were lOund guilty of
first-degree robbery and murder, and sentenced 10 life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, stating that the felony-murder doctrine is "not limited to those deaths which are
foreseeable" but. rather "a felon is held responsible for all killings committed by him or his
accomplices in the course of the felony." Id. at 210, 82 Cal, Rptr. at 603. See also State v.
Edwards, 122 Ariz. 206, 216, 594 P.2d 72, 82 (1979) (death of victim from heart attack,
which occurred during robbery, formed basis for felony-murder conviction despite fact that
death was unintended and accidental); Durden v. State, 250 Ga, 325, 330, 297 S.E.2d 237,
242 (1982) (robbery victim died of heart attack minutes after robbery; life sentence based
On felony murder conviction affirmed).
33 See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 171 So. 2c1 597, 597-98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (court.
lacked jurisdiction but said would have held that defendant was liable when robbery victim
accidentally killed innocent bystander); People v. Hickman, 59 III. 2d 89, 95, 319 N.E.2d
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or an accomplice during the felony," or even when the defendant
is involved in a traffic accident while fleeing the felony, resulting in
death.35
 A defendant who undertakes a felony only after extracting
promises from his co-felon that no one will be hurt likewise is subject
to the full force of the rule when the co-felon breaks the promise. 3 fi
In these situations, the felony murder rule has the potential to
equate any participant in the felony with the cold-blooded deliberate
killer, no matter how unforeseeable the death or how attenuated
that defendant's participation in the felony or the events leading to
death.
Therefore, notwithstanding all of the procedural requirements
imposed upon the states,- the possibility always exists that, with the
511, 514 (1974) (defendant liable when police officer accidentally killed detective while in
pursuit of defendant), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); People v. Podolskim, 332 Mich. 508,
518, 52 N.W.2d 201, 205 (defendant liable when police officer accidentally killed another
officer in gun battle with defendants as defendants were trying to escape from bank robbery),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 634-35, 68 A.2d
595, 614 (1949) (policeman killed by either defendants or fellow policeman, court held
defendants liable in either case), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950); Commonwealth v. Moyer,
357 Pa. 181, 197-98, 53 A.2d 736, 745 (1947) (where victim was killed by other victim or
felon and murder conviction was based on theory that felon was actual killer, court on appeal
upheld conviction and indicated that it could be legitimately based on either theory). For a
more detailed account of this topic, see Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of
Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV, 50 (1956).
34
 Although courts most often do not impose liability upon one to-felon for the death
of another, see 2 W. LAFAVE & A. Scan. , supra note 3, § 7.5, nn. 53-56 (1986), some courts
will uphold a conviction for murder in these circumstances. In California, People v. Washington
set the standard for the imposition of the felony murder doctrine for a co-felon's death. 62
Cal. 2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965). The California Supreme Court held
that the defendant must have intentionally committed acts in which a high probability existed
that these acts would result in death, thus manifesting a conscious disregard of human life,
or malice. id at 782, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446, 402 P.2d at 134. This holding was applied in
People v. Caldwell, 36 Cal. 3d 210, 222, 203 Cal. Rptr. 433, 440, 681 P.2d 274, 281 (1984)
("[Diefendants' malicious conduct of fleeing in a dangerous high-speed chase, confronting
the officers with a dangerous weapon when the chase ended and further preparing to shoot
it out with the deputies was a proximate cause of Belvin's [an accomplice] death.") See also
State v. Baker, 607 S.W,24.1 153, 156 (Mo. 1980) (remanded for new trial for other reasons)
(stating when accomplice was killed by intended robbery victim that "it is of no concern that
the final shot was fired by a person acting to thwart rather than further the commission of
the underlying. felony unless the act of the person directly causing the death was an inde-
pendent intervening cause").
" See, e.g., State v. Hacker, 510 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. fist. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding
felony murder charge when defendants fleeing from robbery collided with another vehicle
while driving at an excessive speed, and the driver of the other vehicle died).
" White v. Dogger, 483 U.S. 1045 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defendant not aware
that confederates intended to kill robbery victims from beginning, voiced opposition to killing
of victims, and did not participate in killings—convicted of felony murder and sentenced to
death).
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felony murder rule as a basis for a capital sentence, some minimally
culpable felony murder defendants, like accidental killers or atten-
uated accomplices to the Felony, will be sentenced to die, even while
many cold-blooded premeditated killers will be allowed to live. This
possibility hardly reflects the proportionality—the reservation of the
death penalty for the worst murderers—that underlies the Court's
entire eighth amendment venture.
B. The Racial Impact of Felony Murder
Changing the rules for murder liability simply because of the
presence of a concurrent felony also has clear racial implication in
modern American society. One recent study of murder cases in
Dade County, Florida vividly demonstrates this racial impact." Ap-
proximately three-quarters of all the first degree murder indict-
ments studied in Dade County involved a victim and a defendant
of the same race. This result was due largely to the racial make-up
for non-felony murders because only eight percent of the non-
felony murders involve killers and victims of different races. In
stark contrast, about: forty-five percent of the felony murders in-
volved victims and defendants of different races, and in ninety-five
percent of these cases, the victim was white and the defendant black.
In addition, of all black defendants indicted for murdering white
" Note, Discrimination and Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Post - Furman
Murder Cases in Dade County, Florida, 1973-1976, 33 STAN. L. REV. 75, 86 (1980). The authors
studied 350 first degree murder indictments and trials between 1973 and 1976 in Dade
County, Florida. Of these, 139 (40. I%) were indicted under the felony murder rule, Under
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West 1976), felony murders were defined as "the unlawful
killing of a human being ... when committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of,
or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, involuntary sexual battery, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb . . .."
The race of the defendant and victim breaks down into the following four offender-
victim categories.
Black offenders/black victims 	  129 cases
White offenders/white victims 	  139 cases
Black offenders/white victims 	  73 cases
White offenders/black victims 	  9 cases
The number of cases of white offenders and black victims is clearly too small to analyze.
Although the sample size of 73 for black offenders and white victims is relatively small, the
results reached in this study tend to be supported by other examinations of homicide statistics.
See infra notes 38-41_
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victims, an astounding eighty-four percent were prosecuted under
the felony murder rule."'
The results of this study are corroborated by other statistical
studies. 39 Significantly, some studies also demonstrate that the black
" Note, supra note 37, at 88. The authors' study reveals that although the most frequent
racial combination in felony murders is black defendant/white victim (43%), the most frequent
racial combination for non-felony murders is white defendant/white victim (50%). The im-
portance of the race of the victim has been studied in other statistical works. See infra note
30. In the Dade County study, the percentage of white victims is much higher in felony
murders (80% of all felony murders) than in non-felony murders (56% of all non-felony
murders).
In comparison to the 84% (61 of 73) of all black on white first degree murder indictments
being prosecuted under the felony murder rule, only 20% (78 of 268) of the intraracial
indictments were prosecuted tinder the felony murder rule.
39 Only a few studies actually categorize murders by whether the felony murder rule
has been invoked. See Wolfgang. Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted
Among Admissions to Death ROW, 53 J. CRIM. L. & ClusaiNot.o6v 301 (1962) (study of death
row inmates transferred for execution in Pennsylvania from 19l4-1958); Bedau, Death
Sentences in New fersex, 19 RuTGEus L. Kt:v. 1 (1964) (study of all persons sentenced to death
from 1907 to 1960 in New Jersey). These two studies, however, do not record the race of
the victim.
Most of the more recent studies of homicide cases do record the race of the victim anal
defendant, but do not examine whether the conviction is based on the felony murder rule
or another theory. They do, however, usually look at whether the homicide was accompanied
by a contemporaneous felony, and they all have found that the commission of a contempor-
aneous felony has racial impact implications.
For instance, Gross's arid Mauro's study of homicides reported to the FBI in eight states
from 1976 to 1980 closely parallels the results of the Dade County study. Gross & Mauro,
Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization,
37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 58, 131-43 (1984). Of all the homicides reported, 90% or more involved
killers and victims of the same race (Georgia 92%, Florida 92%, Illinois 92%, North Carolina
92%, Mississippi 93%, Virginia 90%, Arkansas 92%, Oklahoma 91%). The percentage of
non-felony related murders that were intraracial was even higher, ranging from 93% to 96%,
whereas the percentage of intraracial felony related murders ranged from 68%, to 80%
(intraracial percentages for felony murders and non-felony murders, respectively: Arkansas
74%, 95%; Florida 74%, 95%; Georgia 68%, 96%; Illinois 79%, 95%; Mississippi 70%, 96%;
North Carolina 69%, 95%; Oklahoma 80%, 93%; Virginia 68%, 93%). Id. And, as linind in
the Dade County study, the likelihood of a contemporaneous felony being found is much
higher when there is a black defendant and white victim than when the defendant and victim
are of the same race. Id,
Bowers found the same patterns in his study of criminal homicides reported between
1972 and 1977 in Florida, Georgia and Texas. W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATit As
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1869-1982, at 230 (1989). A higher percentage of non-felony
related murders was intraracial Iltan felony murders (Florida-95% to 76%, Georgia-94% to
73%, Texas-95% to 71%). Black defendants are much more likely to he prosecuted with
contemporaneous felonies when they kill white victims in comparison to white defendants
who kill white victims (Florida-60% to 17%, Georgia-52% to 18%, Texas-50% to 10%). Id.
Of all interracial felony murders, it is almost always a black defendant and white victim
(Florida-93%, Georgia-93%, Texas-85%). id.
Some indication exists that the greater likelihood of a contemporaneous felony in black
on white crimes may be due to decisions by the police and prosecutor to increase the
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defendant who killed a white victim during a felony is the defendant.
most likely to receive the death penalty. 1 °
Of course, one can make too much of both the potential dis-
proportionality inherent in the felony murder rule and its racial
aggravating circumstances when there has been a white victim, See Radelet & Pierce. Race
and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'v REV. 587, 600 (1985) (study of
murder indictments in 20 counties in Florida between 1973 and 1976 found that police and
prosecutor were much more likely to that a conicmporaneotts felony was corn rutted
with a white victim, especially in black on white crimes).
For other studies that consider the relationship between felony reorders and race of the
defendant and victim, see Paternoster & Kazyaka, Racial Considerations in Capital Puishment:
The Failure of Evenhanded Justice RI CHALLENGING CANTAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
SGIE:WE APPROAGIIES 125 (1988) (in felony-type capital murder indictments in South Carolina
between 1977 and 1981, the most frequent racial combination was black defendant/white
victim); Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of
the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 Sm'rsoN L. Rev. 133, 194-207 (1986)
(review of various studies showed highest death penalty rates for defendants with white
victims its felony circumstance murders). See also Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal
Law, 73 CORNELL L. Rev. 1(116, 1019-20 (1988) (discussion of unconscious racism and eighth
amendment analysis); Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law Reconceplualization, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1918, 1932 (1980) (historical, emotional, and psychological basis of the felony murder rule).
4" A number of studies have reviewed death penally rates in felony circumstance mur-
ders, In Bowers' study of criminal homicides in Florida, Georgia, and Texas between 1972
and 1977, black defendants who killed white victims in felony type homicides were Intuit
more likely to receive the death penalty than any other defendants. W. BOWERS, supra 1101C
39, at 730.
Paternoster and Kazyaka studied the 309 homicides in South Carolina between 1977
and 1981 with the commission of a felony as the statutory aggravating circumstance. In 114
of the 302 hinnicides (38.7%), the prosecutor sought the death penalty. In comparison, the
death penalty was sought in 55 of the 111 (49.5%) black defendant/white victim felony
circumstance murders, but in only 10 of the 7'2 (13.9%) black defendant/black victim crimes.
Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 39, at 125.
Similarly, Zeisel's study of Florida death 'row intnates found that 83 of 268 (31%) arrests
for murder of a white victim during a felony resulted in death penalty sentencing in com-
parison with I of 110 (1%) of black victim felony-related murders. Zeisel, Race Bias in the
Administration of . the Death Penalty.: The Florida Experience. 95 HARv. L. REV. 456, 459 (1981).
Zeisel suggests that this difference may he explained as a "tabooed border' crossing" in which
a black, perceived as having low status, murders a white, perceived as having higher status,
thereby "invoklingl society's most punitive and repressive responses." Id. at 467. This would
appear to be substantiated by the findings in the study by BaMIN of convicted first degree
murderers in Georgia from 1974 to 1978. Baldus found that the death sentence rates are
highest in armed robbery murders than all other first degree murder convictions with 67 of
146 (46%) of white victim armed robbery murders resulting in the death penalty in compar-
ison wills 113 of 606 (19%) of other homicides, Hallos, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note
39, at 193, 195. Zintring's study also found that black defendants in felony-related murders
with white victims are much noire likely to get life or the death penalty in comparison with
black defendants who kill black victims (65% v. 25%). Zimring, Eiger & O'Malley, Punishing
Homicide in Philadelphia: Perspectives on the Death Penally, 43 U, Gm. L. REV. 227, 232 (1976)
(study of the first 204 homicides reported to Philadelphia police in 1970). According to one
study, the rate of execution is also highest among black felony murders, Wolfgang, Kelly &
Nolde, supra note 39, at. 306 (at 94% execution rate, "lilt is the Negro felony murderer more
than any other type of offender who will suffer the death penalty.").
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impact, primarily because cases are included in the statistics that
assuredly would result in first degree murder convictions and death
sentences without operation of the rule. But. the rule does allow a
large, racially skewed group of defendants whose culpability has
not been examined individually to be convicted of first degree mur-
der, and thus to be potentially eligible for the death penalty.
Ironically, even with the current emphasis on individual culp-
ability and individualized consideration, the impact of the felony
murder rule in capital cases has not diminished at all since the
advent of the post-Furman systems of capital punishment. Rather,
the opposite is true. Now, in many states, a defendant involved in
any capacity in a first degree felony murder is in a worse position
with respect to the death penalty than a defendant convicted of first
degree premeditated and deliberated murder.
IV. FELONY MURDER AS A NARROWING DEVICE--ILLUSION AND
REALITY
Before Furman, the sole function of the felony murder rule in
capital cases, like the premeditation and deliberation formula, was
to provide a basis for a first degree murder conviction. Once the
jury convicted the defendant, whether the basis for conviction was
the felony murder rule or a premeditated and deliberate killing was
unimportant, at least formally, to the sentencer's standardless de-
cision about whether to impose death.
A large majority of states that enacted new death penalty laws
after Furman retained both the premeditation and deliberation for-
mula and one form or another of the felony murder rule, as bases
for a conviction of capital murder.'" Because of the current consti-
tutional requirement for narrowing the class of death-eligible de-
fendants, however, no state allows the execution of a defendant
convicted of murdering someone with premeditation or delibera-
tion unless some other factor is present that makes the defendant
or the crime worse in comparison to other first degree murderers
or murders. This result is not necessarily true for defendants con-
victed under the felony murder rule. Because many states concur-
rently use the felony murder rule both as a basis for a capital
conviction and as a device to narrow the class of death-eligible
4 ' The majority opinion in Enmund u. Florida stated that of the 36 state and federal
jurisdictions which authorized the death penalty in 1982. only 4 completely excluded felony
murder as a capital crime. 458 U.S. 782, 789 n. 6 (1982).
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defendants, a defendant convicted of felony murder may be sen-
tenced to death even in the absence of any other factors in aggra-
vation.
A. The Constitutional Requirement for Narrowing the Class
The Supreme Court has required the states to narrow the
sentencer's consideration of the death penalty to a smaller, more
culpable class of homicide defendants than the pre-Furman class of
death-eligible murderers as a constitutionally necessary first step 42
under the eighth amendment. A state must not only "genuinely
narrow the class of [death eligible] defendants," but must do so in
a way that "reasonably justifies the imposition of a more severe
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder."4 "
A properly applied narrowing device therefore provides a
"principled way to distinguish [the] case, in which the death penalty
was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not," 44 and must.
"differentiate this [death penalty] case in an objective, evenhanded,
and substantively rational way from the many . . . murder cases in
which the death penalty may not be imposed." 4 ' Such a device
theoretically supplies a rational penological basis for executing one
defendant and not another, and thus gives at least some, albeit
incomplete, measure of assurance that a court: is applying the death
penalty proportionally. Even if some defendants who fall within the
restricted class of death-eligible defendants manage to avoid the
death penalty, those who receive it will be among the worst mur-
derers----those whose crimes are "particularly serious or for which
the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate."'"
.12 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50 (1984) (describing the "constitutionally necessary
narrowing function").
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). The Zant decision made clear that this
narrowing function was the only constitutionally required role to be played by aggravating
circumstances in state sentencing systems which employ aggravating circumstances. Prior to
Zant, it was at least arguable that one constitutional role of aggravating circumstances was to
provide guidance to sentencers in determining whether the murder was sufficiently aggra-
vated to support the imposition of the death penalty. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 197-98 (1976) (aggravating circumstances guide the sentenrers in their deliberations).
For a thorough discussion of Zant and the function of aggravating circumstances, see generally
Ledewitz. The New Role of Stanitoty Aggravating Circumstances in American Death Penalty Law,
22 Dug. L. RE v. 317 (1984).
" Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980). See also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356, 363 (1988) (quoting passage).
15 Zoo!, 462 U.S. at 879.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222 (White, J., concurring).
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The critical role played by this narrowing requirement is es-
pecially significant in light of the discretion which the Court has
mandated for the sentencing body, either judge or jury, in a capital
case. 47 Because a capital sentencer now must be allowed wide dis-
cretion to impose a life sentence based upon any mitigating evidence
concerning the character of the defendant or the circumstances of
the crime—a discretion not unlike that used before Furman—the
sentencer should be restricted to using this discretion on a class of
murderers that is demonstrably smaller and more blameworthy
than the class of pre -Furman murderers eligible for the death pen-
alty.
States have adopted different methods to narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants, but in the large majority of states, the
class is narrowed by aggravating circumstances.''" Under this ap-
proach, patterned after the Model Penal Code proposal,``-' the de-
fendant first must be found guilty of first degree murder. The
sentencer then determines the existence or non-existence of legis-
latively enumerated aggravating circumstances in a second proceed-
ing.'"
" See supra note 19 for a discussion of relevant cases.
' 8
 As of 1984, 32 of the states with capital punishment statutes listed specific "aggravating
factors" in their capital punishment statutes. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating
Circumstance In Capital Cakes —The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. REV. 941, 941
-92 n. 2
(1986); see also Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness
and Consistency, 69 Cottraa.i. L. REV. 1129, 1227 n. 662, 1227-32 (1984). 25 states expressly
require finding at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before the
death penalty can be imposed. Id. at 1240 n. 732.
4" See ,Montt. PENAL Co § 210.6 (1980). The Model Penal Code ("M PC") formulation
disallows imposition of the death sentence unless the trier of fact finds one of the enumerated
aggravating circumstances to exist and further finds that no mitigating circumstances suffi-
ciently substantial to call fOr leniency arise. It further would preclude a sentence of death
under a number of circumstances, i.e., if the defendant, with consent of the prosecuting
attorney and approval of the Court, pleaded guilty to non-capital murder; was under age 18
at the time of commission of the crime; was of physical or mental condition which called fOr
leniency; or if the evidence, while sufficient to sustain a conviction, did not foreclose all doubt
respecting the defendant's guilt. The aggravating circumstances suggested by the M PC
include many of the common ones since adopted by most states, including WU rder committed
by a convict, prior convictions of murder or dangerous felony, multiple murders, knowingly
creating a grave risk of danger to many persons, murder during the course of specified
felonies, avoiding arrest or effecting escape, pecuniary gain, and especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel aggravating circumstances. Id. See also Special Project, supra note 48.
5') All of the states with capital punishment statutes have incorporated bifurcated pro-
ceedings. Special Project, supra note 48, at 1224. The commentary to the M PC's capital statute
provides the rationale behind the bifurcation model:
[Sly-stems providing kir jury discretion with respect to capital punishment con-
fron t an inescapable dilemma if the jury is required to impose sentence at the
same time that it renders a verdict on guilt. Such information as prior criminal
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States do not have to follow this exact approach. A few states
have chosen instead to narrow the class of death eligible defendants
by providing restrictive definitions of first degree, or capital, mur-
der. 51 In 1988, in Lowenfield v. Phelps , 52 the Supreme Court approved
this alternative approach, holding that no requirement existed for
narrowing the class at the sentencing stage, provided that the class
of death eligible defendants is, in fact, genuinely narrowed at the
definitional stage. 53 A state therefore could use as an aggravating
circumstance a formula that repeats the definition of first degree
murder."
record or of the accused may be important to choice of punishment yet highly
prejudicial to determination of guilt. Either sentencing must be based on less
than all evidence relevant to the issue, or otherwise inadmissable evidence must.
be allowed in the trial on the ground that it contributes to an informed assess-
ment of sentence . Either choice is undesirable, and the second alternative
may well be unconstitutional.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 comment 8; cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971)
(due process clause does not require bifurcation in capital trial).
The Texas statutory scheme, which the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional in
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976), narrows the scope of those eligible for the death
penalty at the definitional stage by narrowly defining the categories of capital murderers.
The jury then makes its sentencing decision based upon its answer to three additional
questions contained in the Texas capital sentencing statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN, § 19,03
(Vernon 1989) (providing narrow definition of capital murder) and ellx. CRIM. Nob. Coot:
ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (additional special issues must be answered in the
affirmative to impose death penally); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095 (1985) (narrowing at
definition of aggravated murder) and OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (Supp. 1990) (additional
issues must be affirmatively answered to impose death); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.2-31 (1988)
(narrowing occurs at definition) and VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2-264.2 (1983) (additional broad
aggravating factors, one of which must be found before death imposed). For a description
of the California and Louisiana schemes for narrowing the class of death eligible defendants,
see infra note 53.
" 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
" Id. at 246.
54
	 The Louisiana statute limited first-degree murder at the definition stage to those
with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm in five enumerated circumstances. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990). Once convicted of first-degree murder,
the death penalty could not be imposed unless the court found at least one aggravating
circumstance from a statutory list of 10. LA. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp.
1990). The system resembled the 'Texas procedure at the definitional stage, but the more
traditional Florida/Georgia procedure at the sentencing stage. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190.2, 190.3 (West 1988 & Supp. [990) (death penalty cannot be imposed unless statutory
"special circumstance" found; then, aggravating factors, which include "special circum-
stances," are balanced against mitigating factors to determine whether death penalty is
justified). The Lowenfield Court found that the Louisiana system was constitutional under
furek. 484 U.S. 231, '244-46 (1988). As did the Texas statute in Jurek, the Louisiana statute
genuinely narrowed the class of death-eligibles at the guilt phase. The use of the same
narrowing device at the sentencing stage was therefore constitutionally irrelevant. Id. Only
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on this issue, arguing that narrowing must take
place at the sentencing stage of a capital trial, Id. at 255758 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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States have substantial freedom to choose how they wish to
restrict the class of death-eligible defendants, and considerable lat-
itude in determining which circumstances make one murder, or one
murderer, worse than another. 55 The Court has insisted, however,
that the narrowing must be genuine. In two cases, Godfrey v.
Georgia56
 and Maynard v. Cartwright, 57 the Court invalidated aggra-
vating circumstances that had been applied too broadly to perform
their constitutionally required function of reserving the death pen-
alty for the most deserving defendants. 58
B. The Inadequacy of Felony Murder as a Narrowing Device
Before examining the adequacy of any narrowing device to
perform its constitutional function, two preliminary questions must
be answered. First, what is the class that must be narrowed? Second,
how is the constitutionality of a narrowing device to be judged?
The easy answer to the first question is that, at a minimum, the
class that provides the starting point is the class found too broad in
Furman—the class of defendants convicted of first degree or capital
murder. In the vast majority of the cases, this class is comprised of
cases decided under the felony murder rule or the premeditation
and deliberation formula. 59 At a bare minimum, then, a narrowing
device must identify a more restrictive and more culpable class of
first degree murder defendants than the pre-Furman capital homi-
cide class.
Maynard v. Cartwright provides the answer to the second ques-
tion. In Cartwright, the Supreme Court focused solely on Oklahom-
a's application of the narrowing device being challenged, and not
on the defendant's overall culpability, to determine whether the
narrowing device was fulfilling its constitutionally mandated func-
tions. 6° The issue in analyzing a narrowing device, therefore, is not
" For a comprehensive listing of statutory aggravating circumstances, see Special Project,
supra note 48, at 1227-32.
5' 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
57
 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
55 Cartwright invalidated Oklahoma's application of "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravating circumstance, finding that it had been applied so broadly as to conceivably
apply to every first degree murder. Id. at 364. The Court in Godfrey held unconstitutional
the Georgia Supretne Court's upholding of a finding that the defendant's conduct fit. Geor-
gia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" aggravating circumstance. 446
U.S. at 432. For a discussion of Godfrey and the overall problem with the "especially heinous"
aggravating circumstance, see generally, Rosen, supra note 48.
" See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
" In the Court's view, the fact that the defendant in Cartwright had committed an
especially brutal murder was simply not relevant to the infirmity caused by the Oklahoma
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whether the defendant deserves the death penalty, but whether the
narrowing device is both genuinely narrowing the class of death-
eligible defendants and doing so in a way that identifies those de-
fendants most deserving of death.
Cartwright addressed the quantitative requirement for narrow-
ing devices. 'The Court held that the device in question was applied
unconstitutionally because it included too many defendants. A nar-
rowing device also can be inadequate constitutionally because it. fails
to meet the qualitative requirements under the eighth amendment;
that is, because it includes defendants who are not necessarily more
deserving of the death penalty and excludes those who are not
necessarily less deserving. In both instances, quantitative and qual-
itative, the class excluded. by the device must be examined together
with the class included in order to make the necessary judgment.
Only by comparing the two classes can one determine whether the
narrowing device is genuinely identifying a sufficiently narrow class
of defendants more deserving of capital punishment than other
potential capital defendants.
No state has premeditation and deliberation 6 ' as an aggravating
circumstance or other narrowing device. Such a narrowing device
would not provide for any narrower and more culpable class of
homicide defendants than the class that the Court examined in
Furman. The device would describe a large part of the pre-Furman
class but it would not really restrict that class. Although a felony
murder narrowing device does no more to narrow the class than
one based on premeditation and deliberation, many states that cur-
rently impose capital punishment attempt to use a version of the
felony murder rule as a narrowing device.
C. Pure Felony Murder Narrowing States
The felony murder narrowing device appears in different
guises in various states. Some states, several of which have large
death row populations, are pure felony murder states; that is, they
Court's refusal to provide an adequately narrow definition of its "especially heinous" aggra-
vating circumstance. 486 U.S. at 365-66.
SL Florida does have as an aggravating circumstance that the homicide was committed
"in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification," FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(i) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990), but the Florida
Supreme Court has attempted to construe this section narrowly so that it will not apply to
every premeditated and deliberated murder. See, e.g., Preston v. State, 444 So. 2c1 939, 946-
47 (Fla. 1984) (aggravating circumstance requires more than the premeditation required for
first degree murder conviction; finding reversed); see also Carron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353,
360-61 (Fla. 1988) (same); Jackson v, State, 498 So. 2d 906, 910-11 (Fla. 1986) (same).
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allow the defendant to be sentenced to death solely because the
killing took place during an accompanying felony. A defendant. first
can be convicted of first-degree murder because of the rule. The
rule then is used again as an aggravating circumstance, unqualified
at either stage by any mem rea requirement.62
"2 Any attempt to categorize authoritatively the states is difficult, due both to the
complicated interaction between murder statutes, sentencing statutes, and case law, and to
the wide variety of approaches employed by the various states. This difficulty is seen easily
in the opinions in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Justice White, writing for the
majority, finds eight pure fel ony murder stales which authorize the death penalty solely for
participation in a robbery in which another robber takes a life. Id. at 789. Justice O'Connor,
in dissent, adopts a different approach, and finds 20 states which permit imposition of the
death penalty for a felony murderer without a showing of intent to kill. hi. at 820 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
As best as can be determined. of White's group of eight 'pure' felony murder states, at
least four remain in this category—Georgia, Florida, Wyoming, and South Carolina. These
are states in which a defendant can be found guilty of first degree murder under a felony
murder theory and in which the saute underlying felony can serve as an aggravating factor
to justify imposition of the death penalty, unqualilied by a mere rea requirement. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West Supp. 1990) (murder statute) and § 921.141(5)(d) (1985 &
Stipp. 1990) (as aggravating factor) and Melendez v. State, 498 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (1986)
(upholding conviction for felony murder and felony aggravating circumstance) and Clarke
v, State. 443 So. 2d 973, 977-78 (same), cert. denied. 467 U.S. 1210 (1983); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5–I (1988) (murder statute) and § 17-10-30(6)(2) (1982) (felonies as aggravating
factors) and Jefferson v. State, 256 Ga. 821, 829-30, 353 S.E.2d 968, 475 (felony may be
used both as aggravating circumstance and as basis finr febaly murder conviction), cert. denied,
Jefferson v. Georgia, 484 U.S. 872, reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 971 (1987); S.C. Coin: ANN. § 16-
13–Ili (Law. Co-op. 1988) (murder statute) and § 16-3-20(a)(1) (Law. Co-up. 1988) (as
aggravating factor) and State v. Jones, 288 S.C. I, 5, 340 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1985) (concurrent
felony murder conviction and aggravating circumstance), vacated on outer grounds, 476 U.S.
1102 (1986): WYO. STAT. § 6-2-101 (Supp. 1989) (murder statute) and § 6-2-102(h)(iv)
(Supp. 1989) (as aggravating factor) and Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 556-57 (upholding
dual use of felony murder), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077 (1984).
J ust ice %I/kite also included Tennessee, California, Mississippi, and Nevada as pure felony
murder states. Tennessee remained in this category until recently. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-202 (1982) (murder statute) and § 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) (as aggravating factor) and
State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127. 140-41 (1981) (upholding felony murder conviction and
during course of felony aggravating circumstance). The Tennessee legislature, however,
amended its capital punishment statute, effective November 1, 1989, to require recklessness
during the felony before death can be imposed. 'PENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-202(a)(2) (Supp•
1989). Although the California minutes remain unchanged in this respect, see CAI.. PENAL.
Cone § 189 (West 1988) (felony murder statute) and CAL. PENAL. Cone § 190.2(a)(7) (West
1988) (felony murder special circumstance), the California Supreme Court initially reacl
Enniund as requiring a finding of intent to kill before any felony murderer could he executed.
Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 148, 672 P.2d 862, 873, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 91
(1983). The court later overruled Carlos and held that this intent requirement did not extend
to one who actually kills during the course of a felony. People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104,
1195. 742 P.2d 1306, 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585. 609 (1987). After Enniund, the Mississippi
legislature passed a statute requiring a finding that the defendant actually killed, attempted
to kill, intended that the killing take place, or contemplated that lethal force be used. Miss.
CODE ANN, § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1988); see also Nev. Rev. STAT. § 200.033 (Supp. 1989)
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As used in these states, the felony murder narrowing device
fails to meet both the quantitative and the qualitative requirements
for a narrowing device. It provides no meaningful narrowing and,
to the extent that narrowing does exist, it does not serve to identify
the defendants most deserving of death. In these states, felony
murderers are treated essentially the same as they were pre-Furman.
just as before Furman., the simple fact of the accompanying felony
makes the defendant death-eligible. Just as before Furman, the jury
then can exercise its unfettered discretion to determine whether
the defendant is to live or die. Lastly, just as before Furman, this
large, unvariegated class of defendants can include all of the various
accomplices and accidental killers who are swept up by the wide net
of the felony murder rule.
Commentators always have criticized the felony murder rule
for its bootstrapping effect. It vaults a defendant into the class of
murderers without the malice finding usually required, and then,
still without any culpability finding, elevates what otherwise might
not even be a murder to first degree murder. In pure felony murder
states, a third level of bootstrapping arises as the felony murder
defendant is moved up into the supposedly restricted class of de-
fendants eligible for death.
Felony murders have always comprised a significant proportion
of all first-degree murders. One study found that felony murder
indictments comprised forty percent of all first-degree murder in-
dictments." Another nation-wide study found that twenty-eight
(requiring that del'endant killed, attempted 10 kill, or knew, or had reason to know, dun life
would be taken or lethal force used).
Although relatively few in number, the pure felony murder states have a large number
of death sentenced inmates. As of May, 1990, there were 2,341 inmates on death row in the
United States. 308 of them were in Florida, 102 in Georgia, 46 in South Carolina, 2 in
Wyoming, 74 in Tennessee, 279 in California, 41 in Mississippi, and 54 in Nevada. NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Dentlt Raw USA (May 1990).
'' See Note, supra note 37, at 88 (finding 139 of 347 (90%) of first degree murder
indictments to be felony murder indictments). 'lire Florida statutes define felony murders as
the "unlawful killing of a human being . . . when committed by a person engaged in the
perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any . . arson, sexual battery, robbery,
burglary, kidnapping, escape, aggravated child abuse, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb . .." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09(1)(a)
(West Stipp. 1990). For recent cases applying the Florida felony murder rule, see Johnson v.
State, 484 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (conviction upheld where evidence
showed defendant waited in car with intent to commit robbery and did not withdraw from
criminal enterprise); Buford v. Wainwright, 428 So. 2d 1389, 1390 (Fla.) (first degree murder
conviction upheld when unlawful homicide occurred during perpetration of sexual battery),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 9513 (1983); Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765, 767-68 (Ha. 1976) (malice
aforethought supplied by onderlying felony in accidental killing), cert. denied, Adams v.
Florida, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
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percent of all homicides were felony murders."4 Although the Su-
preme Court has never clarified how much narrowing actually is
required, it is certainly more than these studies illustrate. The class
of felony murderers is just too large to serve as a way to limit
meaningfully the reach of the death penalty.
The perverse result of the felony murder narrowing device is
even more troubling. Because the usual class of first degree mur-
derers is made up largely of two groups of defendants, felony
murderers and premeditated and deliberated murderers, the only
defendants who are eliminated by a felony murder narrowing de-
vice are those who kill with premeditation and deliberation, i.e., in
GoRDON, CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW: THE CALIFORNIA EXpER1ENCE 1960-1975 13
(1981), based on FBI data of all homicides committed in the United States in 1974.
Felony murders represent an even higher proportion of the death row population. A
pre-Furman study of Pennsylvania death row inmates fbund that defendants prosecuted by
the felony murder rule represented 60% of those on death row. Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde,
supra note 39, at 304. Data were based on offenders who had been sentenced to death for
first degree murder and who had been transferred to the State Institutional Correction
Facility at Rockview, Pennsylvania, where executions were performed between 1914 and
1958. Id. at 301. The sample does not include death row inmates whose sentences were
commuted or successfully appealed prior to transfer. Id. at 301. In Radelet's and Pierce's
study of Florida counties, murders committed between 1973 and 1977 were categorized by
case record descriptions. Radelet & Pierce, supra note 39, at 597-98. Among first-degree
murder indictments, 353 or the 737 cases (48%) had a felony or possible felony and about
half of these (23% ()kite total cases) were charged with a separate felony. Id. Another study
found that 81% of "t;kgravated murders" involved a contemporaneous felony. Murphy,
Application of the Death Penalty in Cook County, 73 ILL 11.J. 90, 91 (1984). The pool consisted
of defendants round guilty of murder with one or more aggravating circumstances in Cook
County, Illinois between 1977 and 1980. Id. Of the 438 murder indictments with one or
more aggravating circumstances, 353 (81%) involved a felony-related murder; 49 (11%)
murders with multiple victims and another felony; 27 (6%) multiple murders; 6 (1.4%)
contract murders; 2 (.5%) murders of police officers: and I (.2%) contract murder with
additional felony. A felony-related murder was found to be the second most frequent aggra-
vating circumstance, following heinous, atrocious, or cruel murders, in Radelet's study of
Florida death penalty cases from 1972 to 1984. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of
the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C:. DAVIS L. REV. 1400, 1418 (1985). Of the 326 murders,
246 (75.5%) involved at least one aggravating circumstance. Id. The most frequent circum-
stance was, "the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" (203 cases: 83% of
cases with aggravating circumstance, 62% of all death penalty cases). This was hallowed by,
"the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice,
in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit, any robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy or the
unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb" (177 cases: 72%
of cases with aggravating circumstance, 54% or all death penalty cases). Id. All other aggra-
vating circumstances were less frequent, including prior violent felony convictions (116 cases),
during lawful 'arrest or escape (96 cases), committed For pecuniary gain (94 cases), cold!
calculated/premeditated (58 cases), defendant was prisoner (57 cases), knowingly created
great risk of death to many persons (55 cases), and committed to interrupt government
functionienforcement of laws (34 cases). Id.
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cold blood, but not during the course of a felony. Of course, unless
otherwise limited, the class of felony murderers includes not only
cold-blooded killers but also accidental killers and attenuated ac-
complices. Thus, a felony murder narrowing device excludes many
cold-blooded killers while simultaneously making accidental killers
and attenuated accomplices death eligible—hardly the way a nar-
rowing device is supposed to work. A simple felony murder, unac-
companied by any other aggravating factor, is not worse than a
simple premeditated and deliberated murder. If anything, the lat-
ter, which by definition involves a killing in cold blood, involves
more culpability. A procedure that provides death eligibility for the
former solely by eliminating the possibility of execution for the
latter is irrational. For example, an accomplice to a robbery in which
the victim dies accidentally should not be eligible for the death
penalty while a killer who acts with premeditation and deliberation
is excluded from this class.
In addition, not only does the felony murder rule in these
states leave a death-eligible group that is too large, and includes the
least culpable and excludes many of the most culpable, but it also
includes a disproportionately high number of minority defendants
convicted of killing white victims. Ominously, the very size of the
death eligible class provides fertile ground for the discrimination
that has long plagued the administration of capital punishment in
America.
D. Reckless Felony Murder as a Narrowing Device
A few states qualify their felony murder narrowing devices by
requiring that the defendant possess a specified mens rea of reck-
lessness or culpable negligence at either the guilt or sentencing
stage.65 All felony murderers potentially meet a recklessness stan-
dard; that is, one who purposely undertakes a felony that results in
a death almost always can be found reckless." Therefore, the nar-
rowing devices in these states are essentially no different from those
in the pure felony murder states. Further, the Supreme Court case
of Tison v. Arizona now places a nation-wide threshold of culpability
at the reckless indifference level, meaning that a defendant who
acts without reckless indifference is not constitutionally eligible for
6' See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.	 5-10-191(a)(1) (Stipp. 1987) (requiring indifference to
human life);	 CODE ANN. DC. I I. * 4209(e)(1)(j) (Stipp. 1988) (requiring criminal negli-
gence).
'" See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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the death penalty.° Because the absence of reckless indifference
immunizes a defendant constitutionally, its presence can not mean-
ingfully further narrow the class of death eligible defendants.
E. Intentional Felony Murder as a Narrowing Device
Some states qualify their felony murderer narrowing device
with an "intent to kill" requirement." At first blush, it seems that a
felony murder narrowing device thus limited would meet consti-
tutional standards. Requiring that the felon intentionally kill during
the course of a felony actually does identify a class of more culpable
murderers. As in those states that limit first-degree murder to non-
felony murders and then have an aggravating circumstance that the
murder was committed during the course of a felony," an inten-
tional felony murder narrowing device does more than identify one
major component of the pre-Furman class of death eligible defen-
dants. It narrows the class to the set where the two traditional
categories overlap. 70
67
 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
6a
 For states that require intent at the guilt stage, see, e.g.. ALA. Cone § 13A-5-40 (Supp.
1988) and ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(1) (1982) (capital murder means murder as defined in
13A-6-2(a)( )) ("with intent to cause death of another person he causes the death of that
person or of another person"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(1) (West Supp. 1989) ("specific
intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm"); Ottio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(1)) (Anderson
1987) ("no person shall be convicted . . . unless he is specifically found to have intended to
cause the death of another"); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095(2)(d) (1987) ("personally and inten-
tionally committed"); TEX. PENAL. CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1987) ("intentionally
commits the murder"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1988) ("intentionally or know-
ingly"); VA. Cone ANN. § 18.2-31 (1988) ("willful, deliberate and premeditated killing").
Other states place the intent requirement in the aggravating factor. See, e.g„ IDAHO Cone
§ I9-2515(g)(7) (1987) ("with specific intent to cause death"); IND. Cone ANN. § 35-50.2-
9(b)(1) (Burns Supp. 1988) ("by intentionally killing"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-107(7)
(Supp. 1988) (intent, required); NEV. Rev. STAT. § 200.033(4)(a),(b) (1985) (felony aggravating
factor requires finding that defendant "killed or attempted to kill" or "knew or had reason
to know that lethal force would be used"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3 l-20A-5(B) (1987) ("with
intent to kill").
69
 At least two states presently have such a system. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (Vernon
Supp. 1989) and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(2) & (11) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (first degree
murder defined as knowingly causing the death of another after deliberation; murder oc-
curring during a felony can act as aggravating circumstances to warrant imposition of the
death penalty); 18 PA. CONS, STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon 1983) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 97 I 1(d)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (first degree murder confined to intentional killings;
killings committed while in perpetration of a felony is aggravating factor for imposition of
death penalty).
71' Of course, the overlap is riot exact because intent to kill is not the same as premedi-
tation and deliberation. But even before Furman, some courts required only malice aforeth-
ought, and not premeditation and deliberation, for death eligibility for non-felony murderers.
See supra note 5. Also, the distinction between premeditation and deliberation is sometimes
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On the other hand, the number of felony murder defendants
who are not intentional killers is unclear but probably not many,
which means that few defendants are excluded from the class. More
importantly, however, is the undeniable racial impact of the felony
murder rule. Even if limited to those felony murderers who intend
to kill, a felony murder narrowing device undoubtedly continues to
play a major role in placing disproportionate numbers of minority
defendants on death row.''
F. The Broad Pecuniary Gain Narrowing Device
In addition to those states that openly use the felony murder
rule as a narrowing device, some states achieve virtually the same
effect by allowing a conviction for Felony murder and then defining
a facially unrelated aggravating circumstance broadly enough to
include most of those felony murderers. This process most often
occurs with the widely used aggravating circumstance that the mur-
der was committed "For pecuniary gain." 72
State courts interpreting this aggravating circumstance have
tended to do so in one of two ways. Some limit it to cases involving
murder for hire or for obtaining specific sums of money, like in-
surance proceeds or an inheritance. 73 Others broadly construe it to
more theoretical Ihan real. Many courts require no more than that the defendant intended
to kill for an instant to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation, rendering any
distinction largely theoretical. See 2 W. LAFAVE & A. Scam supra note 3, § 7.7(a), at 237.
71 As of May, 1990, over 49% of the inmates on death row in this country were minority
defendants. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Death Row U.S.A. (May 1990).
Committing a nturder For pecuniary gain is the most commonly-used factor, being
employed in 33 states as of 1984. See Special Project, supra note 48,.at 1227 and n.664.
73 This narrow interpretation is mandated by statute in sonic states. See, e.g., OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.095(1)(a)&(1) (1987) (hired killer or soliciting another to murder for hire); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(d)(2) (I'urdon 1082 & Supp. 1989) (defendant paid killer or
was paid to kill); WAsti. REv. Coot; ANN. § 10.95.020(4) & (5) (Supp. 1989) (murder committed
pursuant to agreement to receive money for killing or offering to pay for murder). In
addition, Virginia, which narrows first degree murder at the definitional stage, includes as a
category the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing by another for hire." See VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-31(hy (1988). Since Virginia has adopted the "triggerman" rule under which
only the actual perpetrator of a homicide, the one who "fired the fatal shot," may he convicted
of capital murder, the hiring of another constitutes the stile instance in which the death
penalty may be imposed on one who is not the actual killer. See Coppola v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 243, 258, 257 S.E.2d 797, 808 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
Other states have statutory provisions which are facially broad or ambiguous, but which
have been interpreted narrowly by caselaw. See, e.g., Ashlock v. State, 367 So. 2d 560, 561
(Ala. Grim. App. 1978) (pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances not to be used where
defendant intentionally killed while stealing money), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 562 (Ala. 1979);
State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 538, 250 N.W.2d 867, 874 (pecuniary gain aggravating circum-
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include all felony murder cases where an underlying motive for
monetary gain exists, including all robbery murders and most bur-
glary murders. 74
 In these latter states, most Felony murderers are
automatically death eligible without any further narrowing
required7• because most felony murders occur during robberies or
other crimes committed for monetary gain.'" Moreover, if the qual-
stances do not apply to ordinary robberies), cert. denied,
	 U.S. 912 (1977); boutwell v.
State, 659 P.2d 322, 335-36 (Okla. 1983) (pecuniary gain normally applied only to hired
killer or hirer of hired killer).
74
 See, e.g., State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 400-01, 694 I'.2d 222, 230-31 (broadly inter-
preting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(4)&(5) (Supp. 1988)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143
(1985); Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430 (1980) (interpreting ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-4-604(6) (1987)), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981); Raulerson v. State, 420 So. 2d 567,
571 (Fla. 1982) (interpreting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(f) (West 1984 & Supp. 1989)),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983): Pulliam v. State, 2'36 Ga. 460. 466-67, 224 S.E.2d 8, 13
(interpreting GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(4) (1981)), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976);
Leatherwood v. State, 435 So. 2d 645, 649-50 (Miss. 1983) (interpreting Miss. Come ANN.
§ 99-19-101(5)(f) (Supp. 1988)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 (1984); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C.
93, 107, 282 S.E.2d 439, 448 (1981) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1988)).
75
 Use of a broad pecuniary gain aggravating factor allows states to impose liability based
on participation in the underlying felony, and, if that felony happens to be robbery, utilize
the same factor to justify imposition of the death penalty. This result can occur under the
statutory schemes of Arizona, Idaho, and North Carolina. Five states, the so-called 'pure'
felony murder states (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming) achieve
the same result by basing culpability for the murder on participation in a felony, and using
the same underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance. The robber who commits a
murder can be convicted of the murder and found to have two aggravating circumstances
steering him toward the death penalty based on the exact same conduct, in essence, "triple
jeopardy."
71' One study found that six of every ten felony murders were armed robbery killings.
See W. GORDON, supra note 64,.at 13 (based on national FBI statistics for 1974). Similar results
were found in studies on felony-related murders. Murphy's study of defendants convicted
of murder with one or more aggravating circumstances in Cook County, Illinois between
1977 and 1980 found that armed robberies comprised 58% of all felony-related murders (93
of 161 cases) and 40% of the total sample (93 of 230). Murphy, supra note 64, at 94. In a
study of homicides reported in Philadelphia in 1970, 31 of 38 felony-related murder convic-
tions (81.6%) were for armed robbery murders. Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 40,
at 231. In Paternoster's study of 300 homicides with aggravating felonies, armed robbery
was the most frequent (230, 77% of all cases), followed by torture (57, 19% of all cases), rape
(45, 15% of all cases), larceny with a deadly weapon (38, 13% of all cases), burglary (29, 10%
of all cases), housebreaking (22, 7% of all cases). Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Re-
questing the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
437, 446 (1984). Armed robbery felony murders also are extremely likely to lead to a death
penalty. See, e.g., Note, supra note 37, at 92 (9 out of 10 felony murder death penalties
involved armed robbery).
In a study comparing armed robbery murders with jury trials with all defendants
convicted of first degree murder in Georgia between 1973 and 1978, the death penalty rate
for armed robbery murders was 38% (71 of 188 cases). Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra
note 39, at 193, 195. By comparison, the death sentencing rate for those convicted of first
degree murder was 19% (113 of 606 cases). Id.
Armed robbery felony-related murders also have a high potential for racial bias. In
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ity of the narrowing accomplished by a felony murder narrowing
device is perverse, the quality produced by a broad pecuniary gain
narrowing device is doubly perverse. Like a felony murder narrow-
ing device, a broad pecuniary gain narrowing device excludes most
cold-blooded killers while simultaneously making unintentional kill-
ers and accomplices with varying degrees of culpability death eli-
gible. This represents the first level of narrowing. As with the pure
felony narrowing device, a broad pecuniary gain narrowing device
thus fails to pass constitutional muster because it does not identify
those defendants more deserving of the death penalty as compared
with other first degree murder defendants." A broad pecuniary
gain narrowing device, however, goes one step further than the
felony murder narrowing .device by managing to single out the
potentially least culpable defendants in the universe of felony mur-
derers for imposition of the death penalty.
In addition to excluding most cold-blooded killers, a broad
pecuniary gain narrowing device excludes defendants who kill dur-
ing the course of certain felonies. Aside from robbery and burglary,
the most common of these predicate felonies for first-degree felony
murder are kidnapping, arson, rape, and sexual assault. 78 Yet the
fact that the victim's death occurred during the commission of any
of these felonies should provide substantially more reason to impose
a greater sentence than the fact that the defendant's motive was to
obtain money or property.
Block's and Zimring's study of homicides m Chicago between 1965 and 1970, they found
that in 1970, the 147 robbery killings comprised 18% of all homicides. Block & Zimring,
Homicide in Chicago, 1965-1970, 10 J. RES. GRIM. & DELLNQ. I, 7, 8 (1973). In these robbery
killings, black defendants were most likely to kill black victims; however, when blacks did kill
whites, it was often during an armed robbery. Of the robbery killings committed by blacks,
64% have black victims. Id. But of all armed robbery killings where the victim was white,
83% (40 of 48 cases) involved a black defendant. In contrast, of all other killings where the
victim was white, only 30% (20 of 67 cases) of the defendants were black.
In the Georgia study by Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth, the victim's race was found
to produce the greatest bias in armed robbery cases. Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra
note 39, at 193, 195. Of all those convicted of first degree murder, the death sentencing rate
was 19% (113 of (10(1 cases). Id. For cases with a white victim, the death sentencing rate was
27% (97 of 361 cases), and for black victim cases, 7% (1(i of 245 cases). Id. By comparison,
among those convicted of armed robbery murder, the overall death sentencing rate was 38%
(71 of 188 cases). Id. The rate for white victim killing was 46% (67 of 146 cases), and black
victim killings, 7% (16 of 245 cases). Id.
77 See supra notes 67 and 69 and accompanying text.
78 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (Supp. 1989); Muz. Rev. S'rA'r. ANN. § 13-1105
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1989); 10Ano CODE § 18-4003 (1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.7 (West Supp. 1989). See generally MonF.t. PENAL. CODE § 210.2
comment 6, n.78 (1980) (noting that Si states have limited the reach of the felony-murder
rule to certain statutorily defined felonies, and listing examples).
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The terror suffered by the kidnap victim, the widespread dan-
ger to innocent lives and property caused by the arsonist, and the
suffering and bodily violation endured by victims of sexual assault
and rape—a defendant in all of these cases causes more harm and
is demonstrably more culpable than the defendant whose underly-
ing crime arises from a desire for gain. Of course, varying degrees
of harm and culpability exist in all of these crimes, but, as a whole,
it seems impossible to argue that one who kills out of a need for
money is more deserving, or even equally deserving, of a death
penalty as compared with a rapist or a kidnapper who kills. Yet,
along with the cold-blooded non-felony killers, these defendants are
excluded by a broad pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance.
G. Court Treatment of the Felony Murder Narrowing Device
Courts rarely have addressed use of the felony murder rule as
a narrowing device, either alone or in conjunction with a broad
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance.'" Instead, as in LoWenfield,
courts have focused on the repetition issue, not on whether genuine
narrowing took place or on the quality of the narrowing. For ex-
ample, in 1982, in Collins v. Lockhart," the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals invalidated the Arkansas Supreme Court's broad interpre-
tation of its pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in a felony
murder case because the aggravating circumstance failed to narrow
" In State v. Cherry, the North Carolina Supreme Court held, as a matter of state law,
that the North Carolina merger doctrine prohibited using a felony murder aggravating
circumstance if the defendant had been convicted solely of felony murder. 298 N.C. 86, I I 2—
13, 257 S.E.2d 551, 566-68 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). The court did not
address any constitutional question in so ruling. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, does allow fOr a pecuniary gain aggravating factor whenever the defendant has
been convicted of felony murder on a robbery murder theory. See supra note 74. In State v.
Pritchett, the defendant raised an eighth amendment challenge to the use of a "during the
course of a felony" aggravating circumstance following a felony murder conviction. 621
S.W.2d 127, 140 (Tenn. 1981). After noting its disinclination to follow Cherry, the Tennessee
Supreme Court never dealt with the merits of the defendant's claim. Id. at 141. Instead, it
held that luintil [the United States Supreme] Court instructs otherwise, we reject defendant's
argument that the underlying felony cannot be used as an aggravating circumstance." Id. In
Jefferson a. Slate, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a direct challenge to the adequacy of
its felony murder narrowing device by noting that the Georgia felony murder rule allows a
conviction if' the homicide occurs during the course of any felony, while the aggravating
circumstance is limited to homicides occurring during the course of another capital felony
(murder, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping), an aggravated battery, or burglary or arson in
the first degree. 256 Ga. 821, 829-30, 353 S.E.2d 468, 475 (1987).
" 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
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the class of death-eligible defendants at the sentencing stage.'" The
Eighth Circuit. after Lowenfield overturned Collins, 82 which also was
repudiated by the other circuits."
The Eighth Circuit acted prematurely. Lowenfield did not vali-
date the use of felony murder, or pecuniary gain, as a narrowing
device. In Lowenfield, there was genuine narrowing—the defendant
was convicted under a section of the Louisiana capital murder stat-
ute that provided death-eligibility only for a defendant who inten-
tionally killed two or more people. 84 Lowenfield simply held that,
because this genuine narrowing occurred at the definitional stage,
no eighth amendment requirement arose for further narrowing at
the sentencing stage."
The question of whether the felony murder rule is a sufficient
narrowing device, either by itself or in the guise of a pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance, remains undecided. As a result, defen-
dants continue to be sentenced to death solely because they com-
mitted a murder during the course of a felony, that, is, simply
because they lit into a class of murder defendants that, in sonic
states, is no narrower than before Furman. 81"
"I Id. at 263-64,
We see no escape from the conclusion that an aggravating circumstance which
merely repeats an element of the underlying crime cannot perforw this nar-
rowing !'unction. Every robber-murderer has acted For pecuniary gain. A jury
which has found robbery murder cannot rationally avoid also finding pecuniary
gain. Therefore, the pecuniary-gain aggravating fist ;ince cannot he a factor
that distinguishes some robber-murderers from 01110ES. In effect, a robber-
murderer enters the sentencing phase with a built-in aggravating circumstance.
Id. at 264.	 •
82 See Perry v. Lockhart. 871 F.2d 1384, 1392-93 (8th Cir.) (concluding that Co llins was
indistinguishable from toreenfield and was thus overruled by it), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 378
(1989).
" See, e.g., McKenzie v. Risky, 842 F.2d 1525, 1539 n.30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 250 (1988); Kilter v. Thigpen, 828 17.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Buder, 813
F.2d 664, 673 (5th Cit .. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988).
8 ' Lowenlield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988). Lowenlield himself was convicted of
having specific innait to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person,
representing one of the five categories constituting first-degree murder in Louisiana. Id, at
243. The sole aggravating factor used to sentence Lowenfield to death was "knowingly
creating a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person." Id. (citing LA. REV .
SrAr. ANN. 14:30(A)(3) (West 1986)).
The use of 'aggravating circumstances' is mat au end in itself, but a means or genuinely
narrowing the class of death-eligible pesons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion. We
see to reason why this narrowing function may not he performed by jury findings at either
the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase." Id. at 230-31.
8" See, e.g., Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 193 (Fla. 1984) (jury instructed on both
fekiny Murder and premeditation theories; undifferentiated verdict and felony murder only
valid aggravating circumstance), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533 (1985); Armstrong v. State, 399
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A proper application of the eighth amendment narrowing re-
quirement in felony murder cases would lessen the chance that an
undeserving felony murder defendant, who might not even be
guilty of homicide without the rule, would be placed on death row
with the most heinous killers. Such an application at least would
require for the felony murderer, as well as for the deliberate and
premeditated killer, the presence of some other factor in aggrava-
tion before the defendant could be sentenced to death. Even a
proper application of the narrowing requirement in the felony
murder context, however, would not solve the problems caused by
the contradictions between the felony murder rule and the goals
underlying the Supreme Court's eighth amendment capital juris-
prudence. States have adopted an almost infinite variety of narrow-
ing devices, 87 and,. in many states, a prior minor conviction for
assault, or an escape from a prison sentence imposed for a traffic
offense, can make a convicted murderer, including a felony mur-
derer, death-eligible. 88
The continued use of the felony murder rule, even limited to
its traditional form as a basis for a first degree conviction, still creates
problems in the attempt to limit the infliction of death to the most
So. 2d 953, 963 (Fla. 1981) (basis for conviction unclear; only valid aggravating factor was
felony murder factor). later proceeding, 429 So. 2d 287, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983). Sre
also Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405, 1417 (4th Cir. 1987) (reversing, on other grounds. a
Smith Carolina conviction omit sentence based on felony murder instruction and "in the
course of a felony" aggravating circumstance).
"7 See Special Project, supra note 48, at 1227. Aggravating circumstances can be grouped
into those which involve the defendant's motive. method its• manner of committing the crime,
circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant's status background. and the iden-
tity of the victim. Id. Examples of aggravating circumstances relating to motive are pecuniary
gain, avoiding arrest, or hindering governmental or law en f(trcement functions. Id. at I227-
28 and nit. 664-67. Methods of comtnission include cruelty, variously described as "heinous,"
"atrocious," "cruel," "outrageously or wantonly vile." "horrible," "inhuman," or "exceptionally
brutal." Others frequently included are lying in wait, torture, poison or use of explosives. Id.
at 1228-29 nu. 668-75. Circumstances surrounding the crime, such as committing the crime
in connection with another felony, holding the victim for ransom, as a hostage, or as a shield
may serve as aggravating circumstances. Id. at 1230-31 tin. 679-84. The defendant's back-
ground may be an aggravating factor. Such factors as status as it prisoner or prior commission
of a felony qualify as aggravating factors in many states. N. at 1229-30 on. 676-78. Finally,
the identity of the victim often is used as an aggravating factor. Police officers, firemen,
corrections employees, judges and prosecutors most often comprise this category, although
the fact that the victim was, of could potentially have been, a witness against the defendant
is also common, as are "multiple victim" aggravating circumstances, Id. at 1231-32 nn. 685-
90.
s' Special Project, supra note 48. at 1229-30 nn. 676-77 (24 states consider the defen-
dant's status as a prisoner an aggravating circumstance whole 21 states consider a prior violent
felony or history of violence an aggravating circumstance),
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deserving defendants. Because the rule allows a conviction without
a real examination of blameworthiness, it. creates an opportunity
for death to be imposed on a defendant with limited culpability for
the homicide committed. This consequence represents a problem
of disproportionality. It is in this realm that the Supreme Court has
labored to find a way to address the clash of the two doctrines.
V. FELONY MURDER ACCOMPLICES AND A BRIGHT LINE RULE OF'
DISPROPORTIONALITY
A. The Eighth Amendment and Disproportionality in Non-Capital Cases
Although the eighth amendment contains no explicit prohibi-
tion against disproportionate sentences, the Supreme Court has
held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of that amend-
ment bans sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime
of which the defendant is convicted." In Salem v. Helm,' () the Court's
most recent and most extensive opinion on the scope of the dispro-
portionality principle in non-capital cases, Justice Powell noted that,
"as a matter of principal," a sentence must be proportionate to the
crime of which the defendant has been convicted,'" and that "no
penalty is per se constitutional."' These pronouncements suggest
not only that every criminal defendant has a right to a sentence
"9 The history of the meaning of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause has long been debated by scholars. The eighth amendment is identical to the provision
found in the English Bill ()I' Rights of 1689. See 1 W. & M., sass. 2, c.2. Anthony Granucci
contends that the original intent of the framers of the United States Constitution was to limit
the eighth amendment to prohibiting cruel methods of punishment and riot disproportionate
sentences. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted;" The Original Meaning, 57
CALIE. L. REV. 839, 860 (1969). He Further argues, however, that the framers were acting
out of a misinterpretation of the English Bill of Rights, which prohibited both. Id. at 855-
56. Others argue that the framers intended the eighth amendment to prohibit both dispro-
portionate sentences and cruel methods of punishment. See generally Comment, The Eighth
Amendment, Becarria, and the Enlightenment; An Historical Justification for the Weenis v. United
States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BurFALo L. REV. 783 (1975). Charles Schwartz argues
that, even if the framers misinterpreted the English Bill of Rights, as suggested by Granucci,
the relevant starting point is with the framers' intent for "cruel and unusual," which was that
the provision should be limited to prohibiting barbarous punishment. Schwartz, Eighth Amend-
ment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 378. 380-82 (1980). This division of views also is reflected on the Supreme
Court, with the majority in Solent v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983), holding that the
trainers adopted the principles of proportionality along with the English Bill of Rights, and
the dissenters rejecting this analysis. Id. at 313 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
", Id. at 290.
52 Id.
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that is not disproportionate to the crime committed, but also that
each defendant has an equal right to a determination of this ques-
tion as a matter of federal constitutional law.
In theory, these propositions are true, but in practice, the ef-
ficacy of the proportionality principle is quite limited. Justice Powell
conceded in Helm that a successful proportionality challenge in a
non-capital case would be "exceedingly rare,"`-'" although, by holding
a sentence of imprisonment disproportionate, he and his brethren
in the majority were not quite willing to make it as rare as the
dissenters wished. Outside of capital cases, the Supreme Court itself
has found a sentence grossly disproportionate only on three occa-
sions, all of which involved extremely unusual circumstances.
In Weems v. United States,'
-'4 the Court held disproportionate a
sentence of 15 years of cadena temporal imprisonment for the crime
of falsifying a public document..`' This punishment was part of the
imperial legacy we inherited from Spain when we seized the Phil-
lipine Islands, and required that the imprisonment include both
hard labor in chains and severe civil disabilities.`'[' In Robinson v.
Californio, 97 the Court held disproportionate a sentence of ninety
clays imprisonment because the defendant had not committed any
crime and had received his sentence for the status of being a drug
"3 Id. at 289-90 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,272 (1980)).
94 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
95
 Id. at 382.
"6 Id. at 361. The defendant in Weerm was a minor governmental official. Weems' crime
consisted of entering on the books as paid the sums of 208 and 408 pesetas as wages to
lighthouse keepers when, in fact, such sums had not been paid. Id. at 357-58, The govern-
ment made no allegations of fraud, desire to defraud, or personal enrichment. The offense
consisted merely of intentionally falsifying the record. According to Philtipine law, the pun-
ishment of cadena temporal was defined as "labor for the benefit of the state." Id. at 364.
Those sentenced under its provisions "shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from
the wrists; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor and shall receive no assistance
whatsoever from without the institution." Id. Additionally, the sentence carried certain ac-
cessory penalties, including civil interdiction (deprivation of rights of parental authority,
guardianship of person or property, and the right to dispose of his own property by inter
vivos acts), perpetual absolute disqualification (deprivation of Office, even if held by popular
election, of the right to vote or be elected to public office, retirement pay, and certain honors)
and subjection to surveillance during life. Id. Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, rec-
ognized that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned or offense." Id. at 367. The opinion then compared Weems' sentence with
other sentences imposed for similar crimes in other jurisdictions and less onerous sentences
imposed for more severe crimes within the Phillipines. In the Court's view, this comparison
showed "more than different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It
condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual." Id. at 381.
"7 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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addict." Lastly, in Helm, the trial court had imposed a sentence of
life without parole on a repeat minor offender.• The absence of
the possibility of parole was sufficient to procl the Court into distin-
guishing two prior cases in which it had noted no eighth amendment
problems with extremely long sentences for defendants convicted
of exceedingly minor crimes.'"
The reluctance of the Court to find gross disproportionality in
non-capital sentences does not, however, necessarily limit the scope
of any review for disproportionality in capital cases. As the Court
noted in Helm, disproportionality is an appropriate and special con-
cern in capital cases.'"'
95 Id. at 065. The statute in Robinson Made addiction to the use of narcotics a misde-
meanor punishable by imprisonment. The Court focused on the classification of narcotics
addiction as an illness and that the statute punished the defendant, not fur use or possession
of illegal flare:cities, but merely fru . his status as an addict. Id. at 666-67. In holding the
sentence disproportionate, the Court stated that disproportionality is ''a question which
cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id. it 667.
u" See 463 U.S. 277, 290-97 (1983). Helm was convicted alter pleading guilty to uttering
a no-account check for $100 under a statute which stated: "When a defendant has been
convicted of at least three prior convictions in addition to the principal felony, the sentence
for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Conrylm
LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981) (quoted in Solent v. Helm. 463 U.S. al 281).
His prior convictions involved six nonviolent felonies. 463 U.S. at 279-80. Helm appealed
his sentence to the South Dakota Supreme Court, which ;tflirmed in a 3-2 decision. State v.
Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1981)). He then requested that the governor commute his
sentence but this request was denied. Salem, 463 U.S. at 283. Helm then sought habeas relief
in the federal district court, which denied his petition without a hearing. Helm v. Solent, No.
C1V81-5148, slip op. at 1 (D.S.D. Dec. 12, 1981). On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the
decision of the district court was reversed on eighth amendment grounds. Helm v. Solon,
684 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir, 1982), 403 U.S. at 283.
""' The two prior cases were Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) and RUM MCI v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980). In Hutto, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana and sentenced to 40 years' impris-
onment under Virginia law, 454 U.S. at 370-71. In Rummel, the defendant was convicted of
a third felony, all involving credit card or bad check transactions, which totalled less than
$300, and sentenced to life in prison (with the possibility of parole) under the Texas recidivist
statute. 445 U.S. at 266.
Following the Supreme. Court's lead, the lower federal courts rarely have found non-
capital sentences disproportionate under the eighth amendment. In fact, even after Helm,
some lederal courts refuse to even examine a case for disproportionality if the defendant's
sentence of imprisonment. is less severe than life with out parole. See, e.g., United States v.
Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1175 (3d Cir. 1986) (no need for Court to conduct dispropor-
tionality analysis if sentence is less than life without. parole), red. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987);
United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1027-28 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. dented, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986); cf. Marrero v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1468, 1472 (11th Cir. 1987) (disproportionality
analysis permissible even for lesser sentence), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 965 (1988).
" See 463 U.S. at 289 (acknowledging the Court's previous application of the dispro-
portionality principle in capital cases, and that "the penalty of death differs front all other
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B. Disproportionality in Capital Cases—The General Approach
Some states have statutes requiring their supreme courts to
compare one death sentence against others returned in that state
to determine if that sentence is excessive or disproportionate in
relation to these other sentences.' 02 In 1984, in Pulley v. Harris,'"
the United States Supreme Court held that this comparative pro-
portionality review was not constitutionally required." In doing so,
however, the Court was careful to distinguish this comparative re-
view from the constitutional review for disproportionality required
by the eighth amendment in both capital and non-capital cases.'"
In Harris, as well as in other cases, the Court has tended to
discuss eighth amendment disproportionality review in capital and
non-capital cases as if they were identical, often citing capital dis-
proportionality cases as governing precedent in non-capital cases
and vice-versa.'" To some degree, this is accurate in that both
Capital and non-capital cases certainly are based on the same eighth
amendment principles and concerns. Moreover, in both types of
cases, the Court requires that the decision on possible dispropor-
tionality of the sentence be guided by similar objective criteria—the
seriousness of the offense, the harshness of the penalty, and the
penalties imposed on similarly situated defendants in that and other
jurisdictions. 107
forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind") (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)). See also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272 (noting
uniqueness of death penalty in context of disproportionality analysis).
'°2 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(0(1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(d)(2)(1989).
'"' 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
'"4 Id. at 50-54. Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that this comparative
review, while appropriate, was not a necessary component of a constitutional capital punish-
ment system. Id. at 50.
'"" /d. at 42-43. In fact, one of the Court's reasons for finding the comparative review
unnecessary was the continued protection offered by the eighth amendment disproportion-
ality principle. Id. at 43.
rte' See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,148 (1987) (capital case citing Weems); Id. at
179 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Salem); Salem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,288 (1983) (citing
Enmund, Coker and Gregg); Id. at 291-92 (citing Enmund and Coker); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782,788 (1982) (citing Weems).
1 " See, e.g., Salem, 463 U.S. at 290-92 (relying on two capital cases, Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S, 782 (1982) and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), for objective criteria to be
used in noit-capital disproportionality review). The Court has not always been consistent in
its use of these criteria. Compare Enmund, 458 U.S. at 790-96 (looking at both legislative
enactments and sentencing decisions) with Tison. 481 U.S. at 152-55 (relying solely on legis-
lative enactments). The majority of the Court has held consistently that, although guided by
these objective criteria, the Court ultimately must make its own decision on disproportionality.
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The differences between capital and non-capital cases, never-
theless, are significant, and go far beyond the evident fact that one
of the criteria examined, the harshness of the penalty, is a constant
in all capital cases. The first distinction between the two modes of
proportionality review occurs when the Court makes its initial pro-
portionality determination. In a non-capital case, the Court evalu-
ates whether this sentence is disproportionate to the crime commit-
ted by this defendant. Therefore, under Helm, when a court
undertakes a review for disproportionality, it must examine the
totality of circumstances surrounding the defendant and his
crime.'"8 The principal focus is on the crime and the sentence in
question but other factors, such as the defendant's past criminal
record, also are considered.'" As in all totality of the circumstances
tests, no one factor is dispositive.""
In capital cases, the Court so far has used an approach with a
narrower focus and a broader impact. In determining the dispro-
portionality question in the first instance, the Court has focused on
a single aspect of the defendant or the crime, such as the age of
the defendant or the absence of a death in the crime. It has based
its clisproportionality determination solely on whether the presence
or absence of this single factor makes the death penalty grossly
disproportionate.'" If this determination is made in the defendant's
favor, the Court establishes a categorical bright-line rule, which
prohibits a death sentence for any defendant within the specified
category.
Thus, in Coker v. Georgia," 2 the death penalty was dispropor-
tionate for the rapist solely because a life had not been taken during
his crinie." 8 The other circumstances in the case, including Coker
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2981 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Tison,
481 U.S. at 155-58; Ennnund, 458 U.S. at 797-801.
"3 403 U.S. at 290-92.
109 id .
110 Id. at 291 n.I7 (noting that "no one factor will be dispositive in a given case," so
courts must rely on "a combination of objective factors").
1 " See, e, g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (execution
.of any person tinder age 16 at time of murder committed prohibited by eighth amendment);
Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (execution of any defendant between ages 16 and 18 at time
murder committed not disproportionate under eighth amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 587 (1977) (capital punishment disproportionate for any rape of adult woman).
433 U.S. 584 (1977).
119 Id. at 598. Justice White, writing for a four-Justice plurality, proscribed the death
penalty for any rapist of an adult victim who does not take a life. Even though Coker
previously had been convicted of murder, rape and kidnapping, and even though, he com-
mitted the rape during the course of an armed robbery, he could not be put to death, Id. at
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being a prison escapee who committed armed robbery and kidnap-
ping along with his rape, or that he previously had been convicted
of rape, murder, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, simply were
not germane to the Court's disproportionality inquiry.'" Nor WWI Id
these or any other circumstances be relevant in any other capital
rape case. After Coker, all such defendants are protected from the
death penalty. 15
The differences between the disproportionality review in Helm
and that in Coker also affect the nature of a subsequent dispropor-
tionality challenge, based on the rulings in these cases. A court
conducting a disproportionality inquiry in a non-capital case under
Helm must make a detailed factual and legal inquiry to determine
whether the sentence violates the eighth amendment. "6 In contrast,
598-99. Justices Brennan and Marshall separately concurred, based on their previous opin-
ions that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional. M. at 600 (Brennan and Marshall, J J.,
concurring). Justice Powell concurred in the holding that Coker's death sentence was dispro-
portionate, but objected to the establishment of a categorical rule, expressing his belief that
the death penalty could be proportionate 1hr a rape committed with excessive brutality. Id.
at 601 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
The plurality used a two-part disjunctive test to cletertnine whether the death permits'
was excessive and thus grossly disproportionate. According to this test, a punishment is
excessive if it either "makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals or punish-
ment," or is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id. at 592. The plurality
concluded that the death penalty for rape was excessive under the second part of the test.
Id, The Court noted that Georgia was the only state currently imposing the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman, and that even in Georgia, less than one out of ten juries imposed
the death penalty in rape cases. Id. at 595-596. These statistics provided objective support
for the Court's finding of disproportionality, but the ultimate decision was the Court's.
See 433 U.S. at 587. Coker, by its terms, only invalidated capital punishment for the
rape of an adult woman. At the time of Coker, three states, Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee,
also authorized the death penalty when the rape victim was a child. The Mississippi and
Florida statutes remain on the books today. See Miss. ConE ANN. § 97-3-65(1) (Stipp. 1988)
(when victim under 14 and rapist over 18); FIA. STA•. ANN. § 794.011(2) (West Stipp. 1989)
(when victim under 12 and rapist over 18), but their validity is questionable. Florida subse-
quently has held that a death penalty under § 794.011(2) is prohibited constitutionally. Buford
v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 951-52 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The situation
in Mississippi is still unclear. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 452 So. 2c1 441, 450 (Miss. 1984)
(defendant received life sentence; capital punishment provision discussed). As noted earlier,
every defendant now on death row has been convicted of homicide. See supra note 21.
113 Justice Powell, concurring and dissenting in Coker, resisted the creation of a categor-
ical rule. He would have found Coker's death sentence disproportionate, but would have
allowed for the possibility of a death sentence in a case in which the defendant caused
"serious, lasting harm to the victim." 433 U.S. at 601, 604 (Powell, J., concurring and
dissenting).
"" In United States v. Ortiz, a heroin distribution case, the court reviewed the quantity
of drugs sold; the nature of the transactions; the defendant's criminal record; the length of
prison sentence in comparison to the statutory maximum; parole expectations given gravity
of offense; federal sentences for similar as well as dissimilar crimes in the same jurisdiction;
and sentences imposed fir the coal1 r 1m.ss.on o.	 same crime in other federal jurisdictions.
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an inquiry based on a Coker challenge is fundamentally different. A
court merely has to determine a simple historical fact—whether the
defendant's acts caused a loss of life.' 1  if the defendant falls on
the right side of the bright-line, he or she cannot be executed.
Finally, a categorical Coker- type disproportionality review is
one-sided. When a court rules on a Helm disproportionality chal-
lenge, it makes a ruling one way or another on the disproportion-
ality question. The sentence is either grossly disproportionate or it
is not. When a court makes a finding that a defendant does not fit
under the protections of a specified categorical rule, however, the
result is different. A holding that a defendant's crime involves the
taking of a life and therefore does not fall under the rule of Coker
does not mean that a death sentence is proportionate for that. de-
fendant. The holding means only that the defendant does not get
the benefit of that particular rule.
By using this categorical approach to disproportionality review,
the Supreme Court has tried to solve the contradictions between
the felony murder rule and its eighth amendment capital punish-
ment law. Concentrating on one class of felony murder defendants,
accomplices to the felony, the Court has sought to develop a bright-
line to insulate the least culpable of these defendants from the reach
of the death penalty.
C. Lockett v. Ohio — Flirting With a Bright Line •
Although several of the early eighth amendment capital cases,
including Furman, were felony murder cases, the Court did not
begin to grapple with the interaction between the two doctrines
until 1978 in Lockett v. Ohio. 1 I 8 Lockett was a classic felony murder
case in many ways. Sandra Lockett and her confederates planned
to rob a pawn shop. On the day of the crime, Sandra stayed in the
car while the others went into the shop. They had no plan to kill
or injure anyone but the pawnbroker was fatally shot, when he
grabbed the gun carried by one of the accomplices, causing the gun
742 F.2d 712, 713-17 (2d Cir. 1984), cerl. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1985). See also United States
v. Milburn, 836 F.2d 419, 420-22 (8th Cir.) (saute), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1222 (1988); United
Stales v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1525-29 (I flit Cir. 1984) (using totality or circumstances
approach in narcotics case), eerl. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985).
117
 See, e.g., Cabana Y. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986) (distinguishing simple 'actual
inquiry alter Enmund, from totality of the circumstances inquiry required by Salem v. Helm).
"m 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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to discharge. Lockett received the death penalty for her role in the
crime." 9
At the time the Court decided Lockett, the disproportionality of
the death penalty for a defendant like Sandra Lockett, an accompl-
ice to an accidental felony murder, was still an open question. The
Court already had held in Coker that the death penalty could not
be imposed on a raijisti20
 bu t, in 1976, the Court had held that the
death penalty was not invariably disproportionate for deliberate
murder.m Lockett obviously fell between these two cases.
Seven of the eight Justices participating in the decision voted
to overturn the death penalty because of Lockett's minor role in
the killing. 122
 The four Justice plurality, however, adopted a pro-
ceduralist approach. Without addressing the proportionality ques-
tion, they reversed the death sentence because the Ohio capital
sentencing scheme did not allow the sentencer to give sufficient
mitigating weight to Lockett's role as a minor accomplice in a felony
murder.'"
The other four Justices each wrote separately. Each set out his
views on the disproportionality vet non of a death sentence for a
felony murder accomplice. Justice Rehnquist noted that the felony
murder rule was based on Iclenturies of common law doctrine,"
and he saw no reason to question the right of the states to continue
to utilize it as a basis for capital punishment.' 24 Conversely, Justice
Marshall viewed the imposition of a death penalty following a felony
murder conviction as inevitably leading to "lightning bolt," "freak-
ish," and "wanton" executions in violation of Furman.' 25 Justice
Blackmun acknowledged that the imposition of the death penalty
on a felony murder accomplice "might skirt the limits of the Eighth
Amendment proscription . . . against gross disproportionality," 1213
Id. at 590.
' SI' See 514pra note 107 anti accompanying text.
1 '2 ' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also supra note
202 and accompanying text.
'" Onty Justice Rehnquist voted to uphold the death sentence. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 626
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion was joined by Justices
Stevens, Stewart and Powell, the three Justices who had formed the decisive plurality in the
1976 cases. Id. al 589. Justices Blackmun. Marshall and White all concurred separately. Id.
at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 618 (Marshall, J., concurring), 621 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision.
I" Id. at 605-09. In a final footnote, Justice Burger noted that, because of the procedural
holding, there was no need 10 address the disproportionality issue. 438 U.S. at 609 n.16.
12' Id. at 628, 635 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
125
 Id. at 619-20 (Marshall, •., concurring).
121 ' Id, at 613-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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but was not convinced that a workable disproportionality rule could
be devised. He therefore approved, as the "more manageable alter-
native," the plurality's approach of requiring the sentencer to con-
sider the defendant's degree of participation as a mitigating fac-
tor.' '27
For the purposes of this Article, Justice White's opinion was
the most significant. He was the first Justice to suggest dealing with
the disproportionality problem in felony murder capital cases by
drawing a line down the middle of the felony murder doctrine in
order to distinguish those felony murderers who can receive the
death penalty from those who cannot. 128 Additionally, in the three
subsequent capital cases in which the Court grappled with the prob-
lem of disproportionality in the felony murder context, Justice
White has had the decisive vote.' 29 With the other eight Justices
evenly divided, justice White has played the key role in the Court's
attempt to resolve the felony murder/capital punishment dilemma.
His opinions have set the terms of the debate, and his shifting votes
have shaped the outcome.
Unlike Justice Marshall, justice White did not directly attack
the felony murder rule. In contrast to justice Rehnquist, he did not
consider the centuries of common law pedigree oldie rule sufficient
to end all inquiry. Disagreeing with Justice Blackmun's pessimism,
he discerned a workable bright-line rule of disproportionality, a
rule based on the mesas rea of the defendant. Using the dispropor-
tionality analysis that he had articulated the year before in his
plurality opinion in Coker,'" justice White argued that imposition
of death on a defendant who did. not intend to kill is grossly dis-
proportionate to the severity of the crime, "makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment," and therefore vi-
tr Id. at 614-15 (Blackmun. J., concurring). In a footnote, Justice Blackmun discussed
at length the difficulties involved in establishing a categorical rule based upon the mem rea
of the defendant. Foreshadowing many of the arguments made by Justice O'Connor in her
dissent in Enmund and in her majority opinion in Ti.son, he argued that such a categorical
rule is inappropriate for both the actual killer and the accomplice. Id. at 614-15 n.2 (Black-
mond., concurring).
' 2" Id. at 626.
' 29 The three cases arc Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U.S. 376 (1986), and Ti.son v. Arizona. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). Ail are discussed extensively
infra. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens voted together' in all three cases to
reverse the death penalty, joining Justice White's majority opinion in Enmund and dissenting
in Bullock and Timm, On the other side in all three cases were Justice O'Connor, Justice Powell
and (now Chief) justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger in Enmund and Justice
Scalia in Bullock and Mon.
"" See supra note 1 l 3 for a more complete discussion of Coker.
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olates the eighth amendment.'"' He noted that a line could be drawn
"between the culpability of those who acted with and those who
acted without a purpose to destroy life," and concluded that those
who acted without a purpose to destroy life should be ineligible for
execution. t32
The extended discussions of the felony murder issue in Lockett
gave notice that the Court would revisit the issue. Earl Enmund
and the Florida courts provided the opportunity.
D. Enmund v. Florida — Creating a Line?
Like Sandra Lockett, Earl Enmund was a "wheelman" in an
armed robbery. He never left the car while his co-defendants went
to rob the victims at their farmhouse.'" As in Lockett, the killing in
Enmund was unplanned; one of the victims started the gun battle
which led to the deaths of both victims and the wounding of a co-
defendant.'" Although Enmund was not physically present at the
killing, the Florida Supreme Court held in affirming Enmund's
conviction and sentence of death that he unquestionably was guilty
of first-degree murder, and thus eligible for the death penalty under
Florida's felony murder rule.'"
Justice White, writing for the five-Justice majority, found En-
mund's death penalty disproportionate under the eighth amend-
ment. Looking at both legislative enactments and sentencing statis-
tics, he perceived a societal consensus rejecting the death penalty
for a felony murder accomplice, such as Enmund. 136
 As he did in
' 3 ' Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586. 626 (1978). Thus, in justice White's opinion, the death
penalty for a defendant who does not intend to kill fails under both prongs of the test he
articulated in Coker. See supra note 113 for a description of the Coker test.
' 32 438 U.S. at 626 (White, j., concurring and dissenting).
"3
 Emnund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 784 (1982).
1 " Id. Despite tlte complete lack of evidence placing Enmund at the farmhouse where
the killing took place, the trial court had concluded that he was the triggerman in the killings.
Id, at 787 a.2 (citing Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1372 (Fla. 198 1 )).
"5 Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1370 (Fla. 1981). The Florida Supreme Court
overturned two of the four aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, but affirmed
the death sentence because of the two remaining aggravating circumstances and the lack of
any mitigating circumstances. Id.
13" justice White analyzed the use of capital punishment for non-triggermen convicted
of felony murder according t o the teal set nut in Coker v. Georgia. See supra note 113 for a
description of the test. As evidence of legislative judgments rejecting the death penalty. he
found that only 8 of the 36 jurisdictions authorizing the death penalty allowed imposition of
capital punishment "solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber takes life."
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789, 792 n.5. justice White divided the remaining states into several
groups ranging from those in which felony murder is not a capital crime, through those
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Lockett, Justice White focused on the mem rea of the defendant as
the key element in the proportionality analysis. In contrast to his
Lockett opinion, however, justice White's opinion in Enmund dis-
played on its surface a marked ambivalence about creating a cate-
gorical rule requiring a purpose `to kill. At several points in his
opinion, Justice White described the new rule as one that prohibits
the execution of a defendant who does not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill.'" Elsewhere, he indicated that the death penalty
might be appropriate for an accomplice who "contemplated that.
life would be take:10 38 or "anticipated that ldth2tl force would be
used."'" He never addressed the applicability of the rule to a felon
who personally causes an accidental death in the course of a fe-
lony."' justice White muddied the waters even further by implying
that the error of the Florida Supreme Court lay in its failure to find
any culpability at all based on Enmund's individual role in the
killing,m and by emphasizing the fact, that Enmund was not present
at the scene of the killing." 2
which require intent or proof of a culpable mental state short of intent, to states that simply
require something Inure than mere participation. Id. at 789-92 & justice O'Connor,
writing in dissent, criticized what she termed Justice White's "curious method of counting"
and concluded that 23 states would permit imposition of the death penalty "even though the
felony murderer has neither killed nor intended to kill his victim." Id. at 822 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
197 Id. at 787 (the question presented is whether "death is a valid penalty under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life,
nor intended to take life"); id. at 793 ("current legislative judgment with respect to imposition
of the death penalty where a defendant did nut take life, attempt to take it, or intend to take
life" weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment); id. ai 797 (1W le are not aware of
a single person convicted of felony murder over the past quarter century who did not kill
or attempt to kill, and did not intend the death of the victim, who has been executed
Id. at 801, Justice White never elaborates on his "contemplation" formulation. It
seems most closely to approximate the Model Penal Code culpability requirement of "know-
ingly," which would require that the defendant be aware that it is "practically certain" that
his conduct would cause a death. Montt. PENAL, Coin: § 2.02(2)(1)100 (1980).
139 h:HMUnd, 458 U.S. at 787.
14° In this respect, Justice White's opinion in Entnund seems to indicate a retreat from
his position in Lockett, where he strongly advocated a rule which would insulate from the
death penalty actual killers who lacked an intent to kill as well as accomplices who acted
without an intent to kill. See supra note 131 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice
White's opinion in Lockett. Of course, it was unnecessary to reach that issue in the case because
Enmund was an accomplice. Justice White's seeming retreat perhaps was necessary to gain
the vote of justice Blackmun, who, in Lockett, had indicated a strong opposiMm to extending
an intent-to-kill rule to an actual killer. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 614 11.2 (1978).
14 ' Enmund, 458 U.S. at 793, 800.
"2 Id. at 786 788 & n.2 (quoting Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1370 (Eta. 1981))
(Florida Supreme Court held that the record supported no more than the inference that
Enmund was the person in the car by the side of the road at the time of the killings). In his
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Not surprisingly, the Enmund opinion caused a great deal of
confusion about defining the rule of Enmund, if indeed a rule ex-
isted. Although some courts agreed with Justice O'Connor's conclu-
sion that the majority had drawn a bright-line rule of preclusion
requiring an intent to kill,'" other courts seized on the "contem-
plation that life would be taken" and "anticipation of lethal force"
language as the true minimum threshold.'" A few courts even saw
in Enmund only a case-specific proportionality ruling and limited it •
to its facts, especially the absence of Enmund from the scene of the
killing.'"
As a way to resolve the inherent contradictions between the
eighth amendment and the felony murder rule, Enmund repre-
sented a positive but halting step forward. That the Court even had
discussion of statistics, Justice White also mentioned that of the 739 inmates under death
sentences for homicide for whom sufficient data were available, only 16 "were not physically
present when the fatal assault was committed." Id. at 795.
"1 Id. at 810 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (defendant "contends that because he had nut
actual intent to kill the victims . . . capital punishment is too extreme a penalty"). For cases
reading Enmund as requiring an intent to kill, see, e.g., Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d
131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983) (subsequently overruled in People v. Anderson,
43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987)); State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549
A.2d 792 (1988).
Justice O'Connor's major complaint with the majority opinion was that she viewed it as
"recasting intent as a matter of federal constitutional law." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 802, 824.
She criticized the "intent to kill requirement" as failing to take into account the "complex
picture of the defendant's knowledge of his accomplice's intent and whether he was armed,
and the defendant's contribution to the planning and success of the crime, and the defen-
dant's actual participation during the success of the crime." Id. at 825. She also stated that
prohibiting the death penalty for accomplice felony murder would create a new category of
murder. Id. n.41. Despite quarreling with the majority's creation or a categorical rule of
exclusion, Justice O'Connor indicated that she would remand Enmund based on the failure
of the trial court to adequately consider the evidence of EnniuncEs minor role in mitigation.
Id. at 828-29.
144 See, e.g., Skillern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
873 (1984); Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 83, 656 S.W.2d 684, 686 (1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1051 (1984); People v. Davis, 95 III. 2d 1, 53, 447 N.E.2d 353, 378, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1001 (1983).
'" See, e.g., Allen v. State, 253 Ga. 390, 395, 321 S.E.2d 710, 715 (1984) (defendant
here was active participant; Enmund's responsibility was "more attenuated"), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1059 (1985); James v, State, 453 So. 2d 786, 792 (Fla. 1984) (defendant was present
and actively participating; distinguished from Enmund), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098 (1984).
The degree of confusion following Enmund perhaps can be illustrated best by the fact that
the Florida Supreme Court decided three cases within the same year, each based on a
different interpretation of Enmund, seemingly choosing whichever theory best fit the case at
hand. Compare James v. State, 453 So. 2d 786, 792 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098
(1984) with Funchess v, State, 449 So. 2d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 1984) (Enmund does not apply to
actual killer) and Copeland v. State, 457 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Ha. 1984) (defendant's partici-
pation sufficient to support the conclusion that he "contemplated that life would be taken or
anticipated that lethal force would be used"), cent denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985).
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attempted to remove some felony murder defendants from the
reach of the death penalty served at least as a warning to the state
courts that. death penalties based on felony murder convictions were
suspect. Moreover, even the narrowest reading of the case leads to
the elimination of the death penalty for some minor accomplices
not present at the crime. But the varying interpretations of the
proposed rule of the case meant that the scope of protection it
offered depended primarily on which state was trying to apply it.
This variability seriously undermined its effectiveness as a categor-
ical bright-line rule of disproportionality.""
E. Cabana v. Bullock—The Line Confirmed
Four years later, in Cabana v. Bullock,'" the Court seemingly
laid the controversy about the meaning of Enmund to rest.' Justice
White, now joined by the four dissenters in Enmund, held that
Enmund "imposes a categorical rule: a person who has not in fact
killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that
lethal force be used may not be sentenced to death."'" Under
Bullock, contemplation or anticipation of lethal force is not enough;
an accomplice must intend to use lethal force or to kill. In Bullock,
the issue was whether the required finding had to be made by the
sentencer or whether it could be made by a reviewing court.'"
Rejecting the dissenters' argument that an Enmund finding was an
integral part of the sentencing process,' 5 " the majority described, an
Enmund finding as a simple corrective mechanism that easily could
be applied by any court, state or federal, to ensure that an ineligible
defendant would not be executed. 151
1"B
	
further discussion of the confusion caused by Enmund, see Note, Imposing the
Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REV. 857, 859 (1985); Note,
Enmund v. Florida: The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty Upon a Co-Felon in Felony
Murder, 32 Dr: Your L. Itr.v, 713, 725 (1983).
147 474 U.S. 476 (1980).
1" Id. at 386.
149 Id. at 390.
150 J ustice Blackmun, with whom Justices Marshall and Brennan joined in dissent, argued
that "the Eighth Amendment not only requires that the sentencer make Enmund findings
before it decides that a defendant must die, but also requires that the Enmund factfinder be
present at the trial, to see and hear the witnesses." Id. at 400 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, joined in his dissent by Justice. Brennan, similarly argued that "a Mississippi
jury has not found that respondent Bullock killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing
take place or that lethal force be used It follows that a Mississippi jury has nut determined
that a death sentence is the only response that will satisfy the outrage of the community
." Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 " In so holding, the Court distinguished an Enmund Finding from both a determination
1 150
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Although Bullock, as justice Blackmun argued in dissent, may
have relegated an Enmund finding to the status of a 'judicial after-
thought," 152 the opinion did not represent necessarily a retreat from
Enmund. Rather, the main effect of Bullock arguably was to end the
confusion caused by Enmund and to consolidate the rule of that
case. The four Enmund dissenters seemed to have joined the other
justices in accepting Enmund as a workable bright-line rule of dis-,
proportionality, based on a reasonable but broad reading of En-
mund. A felony murder accomplice would have to kill, attempt to
kill, or intend to kill or use lethal force before the death penalty
could be used.'"
F. Tison v. Arizona—The Line Abandoned
Any positive effect the Bullock decision had in insulating mini-
mally culpable felony murder accomplices from the death penalty
was short-lived. Less than a year later, in Tison v. Arizona,' 54 justice
White provided the fifth vote for Justice O'Connor's majority opin-
ion, which relegated the "categorical rule" of Enmund to little more
than a case-specific finding of disproportionality.'" The Court held
that the Enmund "intent to kill" threshold was inapplicable in most
cases involving felony murder accomplices, and only covered an
accomplice who, like Enmund himself, was "the minor actor in an
armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor
was found to have any culpable mental state." 5"
For all other accomplices, the intent to kill minimum threshold
of culpability was replaced by a two-part test. Execution is allowed
if the defendant was a "major participant" in the underlying felony
and displayed "reckless indifference" or "reckless disregard" for
human life.' 57
 Moreover, the two parts of the test are collapsible—
major participation in some felonies will "necessarily" demonstrate
reckless disregard, and in others, major participation will often
provide "significant support" for that finding.'"
of guilt or innocence, which must be made by a jury under a specified burden of proof, and
a determination of disproportionality under the eighth amendment, which involves a "case-
hy-case, totality-of-the-circumstances" approach. Id, at 384-86.
Id. at 394 (lllackinun, J., dissenting).
l" As to the decision's effect on federal review of an Enmund decision, sec infra notes
169-72 and accompanying text.
'" 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
155
 Id, at 152.
''"" Id, at 149-51.
1 ."7 Id. at 158.
L" Id. at 158 n.12.
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The facts of Tison are extreme, and perhaps explain justice
White's abrupt abandonment of this decade-long effort to require
an intent to kill as a prerequisite for the death penalty. The two
brothers, Ricky and Raymond Tison, helped their father and an-
other convicted murderer escape from the Arizona State Prison by
strolling in with a large ice chest full of weapons.'" Although no
one was injured during the escape, the escapees subsequently
slaughtered a family of four, including a two-year-old child, in order
to steal a car. 16 ()
There was absolutely no evidence that either brother intended
any killing to take place. Indeed, the evidence revealed the oppo-
site—the brothers had extracted a promise from their father that
no one would be hurt." Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court's
strained and belated finding of an intent to kill could not withstand
scrutiny.' 62 Either the rule of Enmund had to be discarded or the
1 " Id. at 139.
After the escape, the -Fison group experienced cal problems during their flight, and
decided to Hag down a passing motorist in order to steal a car. The t u t fortunate victims were
a young couple, accompanied by their 2-year-old sun and 15-year-old niece. After comman-
deering the cat', the Tison group drove the victims deeper into the desert where they were
killed by repeated shotgun blasts by Gary Tison, the father, and his companion, Randy
Greenwalt. The majority noted (hat, although the Tison brothers did not actively participate
in the shootings, neither did they make any affirmative attempt to save the victims or dissuade
their lather from killing them. hi. at 139-41.
16 ' The Tison majority accepted as true that the Tisons "did not intend to kill as the
concept. has been generally understood at cormnoll law" and recognized that no evidence
existed that either of the Tison brothers "took any act which he desired to, or was substantially
certain would, cause death." Id. at ISO. Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, elaborated
on the lack of intent, adding additional evidence "overlooked" by the majority to make an
even stronger case. While the majority noted that the brothers had made no effort to assist
the victims, the dissent pointed out that, at the time of the killings, the brothers were
attempting to find a jug of water fiir the victims. M. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan also noted that the Tisons had "conditioned their participation [in the escape' on
their lather's prothise that no one would get hurt." Id. at 167 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 " 2 In affirming the Tisons' convictions, the Arizona Supreme Court first held that the
Tisons "did not specifically intend that [the victims' die, that they did not plot in advance
that these homicides would take place, [and] t ha t they did not actually pull the triggers."
State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545. 033 P.2d 335, 354 (1981). This case, however, was decided
prior to Enmund, and following Earn and, the Tisons applied to the Arizona Supre Me Court
for post-conviction relief. Man, 481 U.S. at 1.62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). After previously
holding that the Tison brothers did not intend that the killings take place, the Ariz ona
Supreme Court now' attempted to fit the murders into the box prescribed by England by
defining intent broadly enough to include the :activities of the Tisons. According to the
Arizona definition, "lib -item! [sic] to kill includes the situation in which the defendant in-
tended, contemplated, or anticipated that lethal force would or might be used or that life
would or might be taken in accompiishing the underlying felony," State v. Tison, 142 Ariz.
454, 456, 690 P.2d 755, 757 (1984). Justice O'Connor dismissed this attempted broadening
of the definition of intent as "little more than a restatement of the felony-murder rule itself."
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Tison brothers had to be given the protection of the rule. However
ambiguous Enmund might have been, Bullock left no doubt that the
Court indeed had created a categorical rule to apply to all felony
murder accomplices.'" For Justice White, Justice O'Connor's warn-
ing in Edmund that the intent to kill rule was too "crudely crafted"
must have borne fruit.'"
The majority's decision to abandon the intent to kill minimum
threshold drew a bitter and eloquent dissent. from Justice Brennan.
He quarreled with the majority's treatment of precedent. Using
Justice White's own words, he argued the appropriateness of the
intent to kill standard,'" and he chastised the majority for its dicta
indicating belief that the Tison brothers met the new standard.'""
The new rule of Tison on its face, however, seems a modest
retreat from the standard suggested in Enmund and recognized in
Bullock. As Enmund set the bright line at one component of common
law malice, intent to kill, the new standard of Tison seems to ap-
proximate another mental state traditionally encompassed in the
notion of malice—extreme or "depraved heart" recklessness.'" 7
Tison, 481 U.S. at 151. Justice Brennan also criticized the lower court's "misguided attempt
to preserve its earlier judgment by equating intent with foreseeable harm." Id. at 163 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). He correctly pointed out that, under the proposed standard, any par-
ticipant in a violent felony during which a killing occurred, including Enmund, would he
liable for the death penalty." Id.
163
 Tison, 481 U.S. at 173-74.
' 64
 Enrnund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J.. dissenting).
165 Justice Brennan quoted Justice White's opinion in Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 586,
626-28 (1978):
Slociety has made a judgment, which has deep roots in the history of criminal
law distinguishing at least for purpose of the imposition of the death penalty
between the culpability of those who acted with and those who acted without a
purpose to destroy life.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For Justice Brennan's full argument on the
intent-to-kill standard, see id. at 168-74.
'"" Id. at 164-67.
167 Depraved heart or depraved mind murder constitutes the basis for second-degree
murder in a number of jurisdictions. States have defined the term in a variety of ways. See,
e.g.. Napier v. State, 357 So. 2d 1001, 1008 (Ala. Grim. App. 1977), rett'd, 357 So. 2d 1011
(Ala. 1978) ("For purpose of depraved heart murder statute, it 'depraved mind' is one
revealing an extreme indifference to human life."); Maritsa v. State, 394 So. '2d 544, 545
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (describing depraved mind for second degree murder as "an act
which a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious
bodily injury to another, [and] is done from ill-will, hatred, spite. or an evil intent, and is of
a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life"), petition denied. 402 So.
2d 613 (Fla. 1981•; People v. Fenner, 61 N.Y.2d 971, 973, 463 N,E.2d 617, 618, 475 N.V.S.2d
276, '277 (1984) ("In second-degree murder, 'depraved indifference to human life' required
that jury find defendant's conduct, beyond being reckless, so wanton, so deficient in moral
sense of concern, so devoid of regard of life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to
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In several respects, justice O'Connor's approach to setting a
new minimum culpability threshold also is strikingly similar to the
approach contained in the Model Penal Code. Under the Code,
which does not divide murder into degrees, defendants are guilty
of murder, and arc thus death-eligible, not. only if they kill pur-
posely or knowingly, but also if they do so "recklessly under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life." 168
 Justice O'Connor also followed the Code in allowing partic-
ipation in a concurrent felony to be used to show the requisite
recklessness.'''`'
A problem arises with the Tison decision, however, one which
was not mentioned by Justice Brennan in his dissent. It does not lie
in the Court's decision to use one; rather than the other, component
of common law malice as the mens rea threshold for a felony murder
accomplice. Nor does it lie in the majority's obvious belief that the
brothers' culpability was sufficient to permit capital punishment to
be imposed. Rather, the real import of the decision becomes obvious
only upon a close look at. the nature of the Tison standard and its
practical impact.
Because of the vagueness of the reckless indifference standard
and because a determination of reckless indifference is fundamen-
tally different from a determination of intent to kill, the Tison
decision inevitably leads to two results. It minimizes and threatens
to virtually eliminate federal review ola threshold culpability find-
ing—a matter of enormous import in a capital case. It also signals
the effective end of the Court's attempt to control the excesses of
the felony murder rule in the capital punishment context by using
a bright-line rule of disproportionality.
warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who inten-
tionally causes the death of another."); Jones v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 41, 49, 233 N.W.2d 430,
435 (1975) ("Depraved mind as required for conviction of second degree murder is one
which is indifferent to the life of others."): State v. Weso, 60 Wis. 2d 404, 411, 210 N.W.2d
442, 445 (1073) ("More than a high degree of negligence or recklessness must exist, and the
mind must not only disregard the safety of another but be devoid of regard for the life of
another."). See generally W. LAFAVE 84 A. SCarT, CRIMINAL. LAW § 7.4 (1986); R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 73-75 (3d ed. 1082). •
"'" MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1985) (criminal homicide constitutes murder when
"it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life").
I" Moult, PENAL CODE § 2111.2(1)(b) (1985) (reckless indifference to human life "pre-
sumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape").
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VI. THE AFTERMATH OF TISON
A. Tison, Bullock, and Federal Review of a Tison Finding
The diffuse and inherently judgmental nature of a Tison reck-
less indifference finding makes federal review of such a finding by
a state court problematic under any circumstances. If the Court
expands its holding in Cabana v. Bullock to apply in toto to a holding
under Tison, federal review in this area is probably a dead letter.
Because of the inherent difference between an Enmund determi-
nation and a Tison determination, however, Bullock, to the extent
that it limits federal review of a state court decision, should not be
held applicable to a Tison finding that defendants may be executed
because of their reckless indifference to human life.
A court determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life is undertaking a completely different
task from a court determining intent to kill. Instead of deciding
whether a simple historical fact is present, a court looking at reckless
indifference to human life is essentially expressing a moral judg-
ment, a judgment of the culpability of, and not merely the purpose
underlying, a defendant's acts. As the Court has acknowledged
elsewhere, this process reflects that the concept of reckless indiffer-
ence is not a fact but a highly subjective evaluative judgment with
no common core of meaning. 17" •
The nature of the reckless indifference standard is not altered
by the second, or alternative, part of the Tison standard, which
requires that the defendant be a "major" participant in the felony.' 71
A defendant is a "major" participant if he or she is not a "minor"
participant. Almost any participant can be so labelled. Major and
minor just describe two indefinite areas on a continuum of partici-
pation, somewhere between a sole participant and a non-participant.
The Court has acknowledged the elusive nature of the concept of reckless disregard,
or reckless indifference, in its libel cases. For instance, in Si. Amani. v. Thompson, justice
White, writing for the Court, wrote that reckless disregard for the truth in a libel case "cannot
be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked
out through case-by-case adjudication." 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968). In Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., the majority relied in part on this description of the reckless disregard
standard from Si. A maul to support its conclusion that a finding of actual malice in a libel
case should not be subject to the restrictive standard of review contained in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a). 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984). Further, justice White, in his separate
opinion in Bose, distinguished between actual knowledge, which he described as a question
of historical fact, and reckless disregard, which, in his opinion, cannot be so described. Id. at
515.
m See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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Major is just a comparative term, and even Earl Enmund might fit
into this category. Despite his absence from the scene of the killing,
the trial court in his case found that he was not a minor actor
because he helped plan the robbery and drove the getaway car. 172
In Cabana v. Bullock, the Court, without dissent, held that a
finding of intent to kill under Enmund was a factual finding.'" The
primary effect of this holding was to limit federal review of an
Enmund finding because 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) provides a pre-
sumption of correctness in a federal habeas corpus court to any
factual finding made by a state court. 174 Accordingly, as Justice
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 786 ti.2 (1982).
' 7" 474 U.S. 376, 387 (1986) (describing the "requisite factual finding" under Enmund);
see also id. at 396 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Ennuind finding a "constitutionally required
factual predicate for the valid imposition of the death penalty"),
171 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) states:
lo any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,
a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the
writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia,
shall be presumed to he correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
oth erwise  appear, or the respondent shall admit —
(I) that the merits of the Tactual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) t hat the fact finding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court.
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination d ' such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of' the evidence to support such factual determination, is pro-
duced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is
1101 fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when
due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence
of one or more of the circumstances respectively set lOrth in paragraphs num-
bered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is
admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the
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White stated in Bullock, a defendant challenging an adverse state
Enmund finding has to bear a "heavy burden" of showing that the
finding was not fairly supported by the record or that the state
procedures leading to the finding were inadequate.' 75
As in Bullock, the extent to which a federal court will review a
finding by a lower federal court or a state court historically has
been governed by the description given to the finding to be re-
viewed. If a finding is considered a finding of fact, then the review
is circumscribed. If the issue is deemed a legal question or a mixed
question of fact and law, then far more extensive review is permit-
ted. 176
 Section 2254 embodies this distinction.
The fact/law distinction, however, often has proved troubling.
In recent years, the Court has moved away somewhat from sole
reliance on this dichotomy, acknowledging that a decision concern-
ing the scope of review undertaken by a federal court is governed
as much by policy as it is by doctrine.' 77 When the issue under
review is not clearly a simple historical fact or a clear legal question,
the Court now analyzes the scope of review issue as one which
depends in part on whether, "as a matter of the sound administra-
tion of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another
to decide the issue in question." 78
The Bullock conclusion regarding the nature of an Enmund
finding seems correct, or at least defensible. By giving a definite
meaning to the Enmund rule, the Bullock Court provided a basis for
its holding that intent to kill is a simple historical fact. Intent is a
provisions or paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court pro-
ceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determi-
nation, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that
the factual determination by the Slate court was erroneous (emphasis added).
15
 474 U.S. at 388 (citing Sumner v. Mimi, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(d) (1982)).
" Compare Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 552 (1981) (federal court of appeals failed
to give presumption of correctness to underlying factual findings concerning identification
procedures made by state court) with Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972) (conclusion
as to suggestivity of pretrial identification procedures not a question of fact). The Court first
set out the standards for federal habeas review of state court findings in Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963), and the Court's holding was later. incorporated into 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
For a lengthy discussion of the fact/law distinction, and the problems inherent in this dis-
tinction, see Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 CoLum. L. REV. 229 (1985).
177 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985) (citing Monaghan, supra note 176).
In terms of fact allocation, "the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination
that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned
than another to decide the issue in question." Id, at 114.
17" Id. at 114.
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fact, albeit often a difficult one to determine, and thus section 2254
would seem to apply in full force. 17"
The allocation of resources achieved by the holding in Bullock
also appears justified. The Court's decision to leave the primary
Enmund decision with the state courts appears to finely balance the
interests of the defendant and the state. The state courts are ac-
corded a degree of deference, allowed to determine credibility of
witnesses, and resolve factual disputes. But the federal courts easily
can review the record to judge the correctness of the ultimate
decision. The Tison opinion itself demonstrates as much. All of the
justices were able to agree that the Arizona Supreme Court's intent
to kill finding was unsupported by the record under any reasonable
interpretation of the phrase.'"
In contrast, as a matter of' common sense, a Tison reckless
indifference finding is plainly not a Licata! finding. As a moral
evaluative judgment, it is either a legal finding or at least a mixed
finding of fact and law, which "requires the application of legal
principles to the historical facts of [the] case."'"' The justices already
have remarked upon the unsuitability of describing something as
vague as reckless disregard as a factual finding in libel cases.'"
There is no reason to presume that reckless indifference to human
life in a capital case is any more suited to this function.
The modern test yields the same result. Unless a federal court
is allowed some freedom to make a de novo reckless indifference
determination, even giving full credence to state court determina-
tions of subsidiary historical facts, there will be no effective federal
17" The Enmundlltullock rule fits well into the definition provided by Professor Monaghan
for identifying historical facts:
Fact identification .. . is a case-specific• inquiry into what happened here. It is
designed to yield only assertions that can be made without. significantly implicat-
ing the governing legal principles. Such assertions, fur example, generally re-
spond to inquiries about who, when, what, and where—inquiries that can he
made "by a person who is ignorant of the applicable law."
Monaghan, supra note 176, at 235.
Treating intent to kill as a factual finding also is compatible with the Court's analysis in
AI Wen Analytically, justice O'Connor stated "an issue [that] involves an inquiry into state of
mind is not at all inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact." Miller, 474 U.S. at 113.
'"" See supra note 161 for a discussion of the majority's repudiation of the Arizona
Supreme Court's finding. The dissent likewise agreed that. intent could not be equated with
foreseeable harm, as the Arizona Supreme Court had suggested, Fenton, 474 U.S. ill 163
(Brennan,.., dissenting).
'" 1 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 946 U.S. 335, 342 (1980); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
309 11.6 (1963) (mixed questions of fact and law "require the application of a legal standard
to the historical-fact determinations").
'" See supra note 170. •
1158	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:1103
review in this area. Because reckless indifference arguably is present
in every felony murder, some support in the record always will exist
for a state court finding of reckless indifference.
It is one thing for a court, such as the Supreme Court in Tison,
to search the record to see if any evidence exists to support some-
thing that has a core meaning, such as intent. It is quite another to
do the same thing for something as value-laden and nebulous as
reckless indifference to human life. Therefore, the choice is be-
tween leaving the Tison determination solely to the state courts or
allowing the federal courts to participate by granting them a
broader scope of review than permitted by section 2254(d). As a
matter of judicial allocation, the latter is the only logical solution.
In capital cases, adequate federal review and enforcement is
all-important. Although there well may be a debate about the will-
ingness and competence of state judges to enforce other federal
norms, constitutional and otherwise, death is unquestionably dif-
ferent in this respect. Of all cases, capital trials most often inflame
community passions. A state judge, living in the midst of the outrage
caused by the crime, commonly subject to a future election, must
be aware of the cost of ordering a new trial or sentencing for a
convicted murderer. Recent history teaches us that elected judges
deemed soft on capital punishment can lose their jobs."'
In contrast, Article III was included in the Constitution to
address the need for federal judges to be insulated from community
outrage. 184 Immune from political pressures and tenured for life,
Three justices were voted out of the California Supreme Court in 1986 because of
their records on the death penalty. The Los Angeles Times reported, "[a]fter nine years in
the job, [Chief Justice Rose] Bird fell victim to a multimillion dollar campaign that focused
on her long record of voting to overturn death sentences. Bird's 'box score', as it became
known, of 61 reversal votes in 61 capital cases became a constant refrain of the campaign
against her." Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1986,
§ 1, at 8, col. 4. In addition to Chief justice Bird, Associate justices Reynoso and Grodin also
were targeted for their records of 46 reversals in 47 cases and 40 reversals in 45 cases,
respectively. Id. The 10-million-dollar campaign appealed to the public's emotions by adver-
tisements including the mother of a 12-year-old murdered girl. Id., § 1, at 24, col. I. These
are the first justices voted out since the change in the California judicial election system in
1934. id. , § 1, at 24, col. 2.
1 "4
 Alexander Hamilton expressed his views in The Federalist No. 81:
But ought not a more direct and explicit provision to have been made in favour
of the State courts? 'there are, in my opinion, substantial reasons against such
a provision: The most discerning cannot Foresee how far the prevalency of a
local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of
national causes; whilst every man may discover that courts constituted like those
be improper chttnnels of the judicial authority of the union. State judges,
holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little
independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.
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federal judges have served as the primary guarantors of the eighth
amendment rights granted to capital defendants by the Supreme
Court.'" Since 1976, the federal courts have reversed an inordi-
nately large number of capital cases.' 8" Capital cases involving even
the most egregious of constitutional rights too often have passed
untouched through the various stages of state review, only to he
reversed years later in a federal habeas corpus court. 187 Although
there are state reversals of capital cases, one can only wonder how
many reversals there would be without the specter of further federal
habeas review looming in the background. Federal habeas review,
therefore, unquestionably is necessary in order to ensure that state
courts follow the dictates of the constitution.'" Finally, the impor-
The Federalist No. 81, at 415 (A. Hamilton) (Ni. Beloff 2d ed, 1987). As Professor James
Liebman states: "fqapital cases present the situation in which the clash in the state courts
between parochial interests and emotions and national constitutional law and liberties is most
likely to favor the former and demean the latter ...."
I I . LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2, at 22 (1988).
18,
 "jElxperience suggests that. federal courts stand in a better position to adjudicate
constitutional rights." Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1295 u.S (9tIt Cir.) (Reinhardt,
J., concurring), cm. denied, I 10 S. Ct. 349 (1989). The instil tit ional differences which underlie
the federal court's primary role in this area are discussed at length in Neuborne, The Myth
of Parity, 90 l4nitv..1- REV. 1 105, 1 1 18-30 (1977). Professor Neuborne notes that the federal
judges provide a more effective forum for adjudicating constitutional rights because of their
ability to resist majoritarian pressures, their superior technical competence in this lick!, and
certain psychological factors that make them more receptive to constitutional claims. Id. at
1120-28.
I" See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, j., dissenting) (since
1976, capital defendant prevailed in 23 out of 34 federal habeas cases, 15 out of 21 in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals); Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post -Conviction Attorney Crisis
on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 513, 521 (1988) (between 1976 and 1983, favorable decisions
lor capital habeas petitioners in 73.2% of the cases, as opposed to a 6.5% success rate for
non-capital petitioners): Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis- , 14 Hum. RTS. 14, 51 (1987) (noting
obvious fact that in every case in which the habeas petitioner prevails state courts had already
rejected the claims).
' 8' See, e.g., Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280. 1289 (9th Cir.) (death penalty
reversed when defendant had no way of knowing that evidence from the trial could be
considered in the sentencing phase under a new death penalty statute not in effect at the
time of original trial), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945,
951 (4th Cir. 1088) (black dele.tulant's capital conviction reversed for failure of prosecution
to disclose that sole eyewitness had told police that perpetrator was white), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1172 (1989).
"1" See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 12 I 2, 1217 (1990) (primary function of federal
habeas review is to deter state courts from departing from constitutional norms); Sallie v.
Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1261) (1990) (same). As Justice Brennan has noted, 'an awareness by
state tribunals that the procedural barrier to state review would riot be deemed necessarily a
barrier to federal review, would provide an incentive for state courts to reach serious con-
stitutional claims and vindicate them in proper cases." Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and
State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH 1.. REV. 423, 442 (1961).
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tance of federal review is heightened even further when the claim
involves a disproportionality challenge. A finding of ineligibility
under a categorical rule is a definitive finding that the death penalty
cannot be imposed on the defendant for the particular crime. This
result means that a judge who makes this finding will have to face
far more outrage than if the only result of' a ruling favorable to the
defendant is a resentencing trial with the real possibility of' a new
death penalty in the future.
In the Bose case, the Court held that a finding whether a libel
defendant acted with or without reckless disregard for the truth is
not a factual finding entitled to the deferential "clearly erroneous"
standard of review of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).' 89
Similarly, the Court has held that a finding concerning the volun-
tariness of a confession of a criminal defendant is not a finding of
fact subject to the strictures of section 2254(d). 19" In light of the
imperative for effective federal review of a capital case, a state court
finding that a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life should be treated the same way. Each of these decisions has a
"uniquely legal climension."'•'t All of them are essentially evaluative
judgments, and depend upon the evaluator's consideration of a
plethora of legal, moral, and factual considerations. In all of these
situations, the ultimate decision requires as much a determination
of legal principles as a determination of fact. A federal court is in
a better position than a state court to make the decision in each of
these situations.' 92
In his study of federal habeas corpus actions filed in the District of Massachusetts from
1970 through 1972, Professor Shapiro found that:
Wu sum, there are a substantial number of cases—difficult to count because
they are not often disclosed by the face of I he record—where habeas corpus
proves a useful remedy 'even though the matter prayed for is not granted. For
the most part, these are cases in which state processes have for one reason or
another been derailed and federal assistance has been helpful in getting them
back on the track—cases in which even the most vigorous critics agree that
habeas corpus has an important function to perform.
Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts. 87 H ARV. L. REV. 321, 342 (1973).
IK9
 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
' 9(' Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985).
19 ' Id. at 116.
19' In determining whether the voluntariness of a confession should be considered a
factual or a legal conclusion, the Court in Fenton addressed both the "uniquely legal dimen-
sion" of a confession, id. at 116, and the role of independent federal review in protecting
the defendant's rights, id. at 118. The Court reasoned that "Ialt least in those instances in
which Congress has not spoken and in which the issue falls somewhere between a pristine
legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a
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A federal court, then, should be able to make an independent .
determination of whether a felony murder accomplice acted with
reckless indifference to human life. The Tison rule will offer even
a modicum of protection to felony murder accomplices only if the
federal court is so allowed.
B. The Demise of the Bright-Line Rule
The Supreme Court creates a bright-line rule when it confronts
a problem serious and pervasive enough to require correction in a
relatively large number of cases. The best way to solve this problem
is to create a firm rule to govern the cases arising under the rule." 3
For a bright-line rule to work, however, there must •be a clear
demarcation that puts some actions or individuals on one side of
the rule, and others on the other side.t "4 As long as this demarcation
exists, the rule may accomplish its primary purposes. It solves the
identified problem by drawing a clear line of distinction; it provides
guidance and direction to those who must apply or enforce the rule;
and it eliminates the need for case-by-case, totality of the circum-
stances determinations."5
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is
better positioned than another to decide the question." Id. at 114. This does not mean that
all facts in the record relating to the confession must have independent review. Determina-
tions such as the resolution of conflicting testimony by the jury will be preserved assuming
it is "fairly supported in the record." Id. at 117. "But once such underlying factual issues
have been resolved, and the moment. comes for determining whether, under the totality of
die circumstances, the confession was obtained in a manner consistent with the Constitution,
the state-court judge is not in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court
to make that determination." Id. The issue is the same in the determination of reckless
indifference to human life. There may be a presumption of correctness of' the findings of
historical facts about the crime, but the determination of whether, in totality, they rise to the
level of reckless indifference can and should receive independent review by federal habeas
courts.
"I See generally LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr, L. Rev. 307, 320-33 (1982). For further discussion of
the Supreme Court's use of bright line rules and the policies underlying this use, see
Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT, L. Rev, 227 (1984);
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rev. 349 (1974); LaFave,"Case-
by-Ca,te Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT.
Rev. 127.
'v .' As Professor LaFave states, a bright line rule must "have clear and certain bound-
aries." LaFave, ,supra note 193, at 325.
10 "The function of such rules is to remove the uncertainty from fourth amendment
law for the police and the courts. Rather than leaving permissible search and seizure practices
dependent on case-by-case evaluation of the justification for the procedure employed, hard
and last rules are designed to make the fourth amendment clear and consistent for those
who apply it." Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in
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The EntnundlBullock rule served this function, at least for the
short time it existed. As Justice O'Connor acknowledged in Tison,
the standard of intent to kill has a recognizable core of meaning."'
That is, one acts - in this mental state when one intends to cause the
death of another. A problem may arise determining whether or not
the evidence in a given case is sufficient to meet the standard, but
there is no uncertainty in determining the standard. Accomplices
who act with a purpose to kill fall on one side of the standard, while
those who lack this purpose fall on the other side. As Justice White
explained in Bullock, a court applying this rule simply had to make
a simple factual determination.
The Tison reckless indifference standard is anything but a
bright. line. There is neither a clear line of demarcation nor any
real guidance. Whether any felony murderer comes under the rule
depends on the decision maker's subjective moral evaluation of the
defendant's acts. Because of its indefiniteness, the Tison standard
rationally can be held to apply to every felony murder accomplice.
In every felony murder case, the defendant has agreed to commit
a dangerous felony and, as a result, someone has ended up dead.
This action certainly approximates the idea of reckless indiffer-
ence.' 97 After Tison, even the accomplice extracting promises from
the principal felons that there would be no killings would not shield
an accomplice from a reckless indifference finding.•'
The potential overinclusiveness arising from the vagueness of
the reckless indifference standard raises an interesting parallel with
the "especially heinous" narrowing device that has so troubled the
Court. The Court twice has struck down a death sentence based on
the Criminal Process, 24 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 335, 346 (1983); see also LaFave, supra note 193,
at 325 (bright line rule must make case-by-case adjudication unnecessary).
' 96 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150 (1987). O'Connor uses the definition offered by
W. LAFAVE & A. Scam CRIMINAL LAW § 28 (1972): "01w intends certain consequences when
he desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences are
substantially certain to result from his acts."
' 97
 This reckless indifference is especially so in regard to the felonies such as robbery,
arson, kidnapping and rape. which most commonly appear in modern first-degree felony
murder statutes. See supra note 64. These felonies are included in the felony murder statutes
precisely because they are inherently dangerous and more likely to result in death. For other
criticisms of the overinclusiveness of the Thou standard, see, e.g., Note, Reckless Indifference
as Intent to Kill: The Dispropunionality of Punishment After Timm v. Arizona, 20 CONN. L. REV.
723, 751, 756, 757 (1988); Note, The Supreme Court and Timm v. Arizona: A Capital Example
o fJudicial Unsoundness, 29 B.C.L. Rev. 969, 1006 (1988). See also Comment, Tison v. Arizona:
No Intent Required fin - Death Penalty of Accomplice in Felony Murder, 10 CRIM. UST. J. 167 (1987)
(criticizing standard).
"8 See supra note 154 and accompanying text,
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this narrowing device because of the absence of a limiting principle
either inherent in its words or developed by the state appellate
court.'• The problem with such a narrowing device is that every
first degree murder arguably is heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The
absence of any core of meaning makes the device ineffectual to
carry out its constitutional function of narrowing the class of death
eligible defendants:21 "J Similarly, the same lack of' an identifiable core
inherent in the Timm rule renders it incapable of carrying out any
constitutionally meaningful delineation between classes of felony
murder accomplices because every felony murder accomplice ar-
guably is recklessly indifferent.
The Tison rule therefore serves as more of an exhortation than
a true categorical rule. It tells the states that some Felony murder
accomplices should not be executed, but provides little meaningful
guidance in identifying these accomplices. Like the Arizona Su-
preme Court's strained reading of the intent to kill standard in
Tison, 2 " 1 the reckless indifference standard of Tison is nothing more
than a redressing of the felony murder rule in slightly different
clothing.
Disproportionality review under the eighth amendment, how-
ever, still has a place in limiting the death penalty in felony murder
cases. The Court's retreat from a bright-line rule does not eliminate
the concerns that initially led to the creation of the rule. The same
overinclusiveness and potential disproportionality inherent in the
felony murder rule, which first led the Court to create the Enmund
categorical rule, still remains. Now, after Tison, courts will have to
address these concerns in capital cases.
VII. CASE-SPECIFIC DISPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW FOR FELONY
MURDER ACCOMPLICES
Consider a death sentence imposed on a defendant who just
misses fitting into all of the preclusive disproportionality categories
' 99 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S 356, 363-64 (1988) (holding Oklahoma court's
application of "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance unconstitu-
tional); Godfrey v. Georgia, 44ti U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (overruling death sentence based
on Georgia's version of the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance). For a pre-Car-
twright discussion of the problems caused by the "especially heinous" aggravating circum-
stance, see Rosen. supra note 58.
211 See Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. at 1859 (acknowledging that every capital murder could be
considered especially heinous); Georgia, 446 U.S. at 429 (same).
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 151 (1987) (Arizona Supreme Court's attempt to
expand Enmunds intent to kill requirement to facts of non amount. to "little more than a
restatement of the felony murder rule itself").
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recognized by the Court. The defendant is 16 years old. He is
mentally retarded but not insane, and he is convicted of being an
accomplice to an accidental felony murder. Coker v. Georgia 2"2 offers
no protection because a death has occurred. Stanford v. Kentucky213
leaves him death-eligible despite his youth. Penny v. Lynaugh 20.1 re-
fused to erect a categorical rule based on mental retardation. The
defendant always can be too involved in the felony to be shielded
from the death penalty by Tison.
Is this defendant among those "worst" murderers for whom
the Court wishes to reserve the death penalty? Consistent with the
concerns expressed in Furman and subsequent cases, can he or she
be executed while thousands of deliberate cold-blooded murderers
are allowed to live?
The only sensible answer is a negative one. A death sentence
in these circumstances would be grossly disproportionate to the
individual culpability and blameworthiness of this defendant. This
result can only be reached, however, if a court considers the dis-
proportionality of the death sentence in light of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the case.
Since 1976, the Supreme Court, preoccupied with experiment-
ing with the fashioning of various bright-line disproportionality
rules, never has openly conducted a case-specific disproportionality
review in a capital case. The Court has neither explained why it has
thus limited its disproportionality review in capital cases to the
categorical method nor why it. has never used this approach in non-
capital cases.
The reason for this differentiation between approaches in cap-
ital and non-capital cases is discernible from the opinions in Solem
v. Helm.205 Two strains unite the several opinions in Helm. One strain
is that disproportionality is a special concern in capital cases. 206 The
other strain is a desire to limit the practice of disproportionality
review. In so doing, courts will not have to undertake routinely this
202 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
205 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2977-79 (1989) (refusing to establish categorical rule prohibiting
death penalty for defendant 16 or 17 years old at time of offense).
2" 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2958 (1989) (refusing to establish categorical rule of preclusion for
mentally retarded defendant).
205
 463 U.S. 277 (1983). For a discussion of Helm, see supra notes 89-92 and accom-
panying text.
zs' See id. at 289 (noting uniqueness of capital cases and willingness of Court to consider
disproportionality in capital cases), and at 306 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980), for proposition that disproportionality is a "unique" concern
in capital cases).
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arduous task and such review will not turn into a more generalized
appellate review of sentences:207
The categorical rules the Court has developed in capital cases
minimize the inherent contradictions between these two concerns.
The categorical rules give special protections to broad groups of
potential capital defendants and, at the same time, minimize and
simplify the burdens on the courts. In most cases, it is not a difficult
task at either the trial or appellate level to determine whether a
defendant falls on one side or the other of the bright line, i.e.,
whether the defendant was under 16 at the time of the crime or
whether someone died as a result of the crime. The real dispro-
portionality inquiry is the initial decision about whether to adopt a
rule. This decision already will have been accomplished by the time
most cases arise.L°"
The categorical rules, however, are only tools to help the courts
prevent disproportionality; they are not ends in themselves. Cate-
gorical rules are broad and inflexible, and no matter how many
categorical rules the Court decides to adopt, some death penalties
would still be grossly disproportionate and outside the reach of the
rules. 20" Because a defendant does not fall into one of the rigid
categories of defendants for whom the death penalty is proscribed
does not mean either that the death sentence is proportionate or
that the court has reviewed the defendant's case for disproportion-
ality. It merely means that the death sentence imposed in the par-
ticular case is not disproportionate for the particular reason em-
bodied in the particular rule.
Even a death penalty imposed for a deliberated and premedi-
tated murder may be grossly disproportionate under the eighth
amendment. After all, in Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart did not
hold that any death sentence imposed for deliberate murder is ipso
2" Id. at 290 n.I 6 (noting concern with appellate review of sentences and noting "sub-
stantial deference" that must be given to legislative judgments as to the appropriate sentence),
and at 315 (Burger, dissenting) (warning that the majority decision will "flood the
appellate courts with cases").
1"" As noted at supra note 145, Justice White relied on this difference in the types of
review required in his decision in Bullock. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986).
2" This proposition only recognizes the obvious fact that categorical rules may sometimes
provide less protection and cause more administrative problems than the alternative case-by-
case approach. Professor LaFave states that. uric question the Court must always ask before
adopting a categorical rule is whether it is truly a workable approach to solving a particular
problem. LaFave, supra note 193, at 326. See also Alschuler, supra note 193, at 287-88
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facto proportionate, only that a death penalty is not invariably dis-
proportionate to the crime in that situation." ) For example, some
defendants commit euthanasia in order to end the suffering of a
loved one. These defendants can be, and sometimes are, convicted
of first-degree premeditated and deliberated murder. 2 " Given the
wide variety of aggravating circumstances used by the states, these
types of murderers are not ineligible automatically for the death
penalty.2 ' 2
These defendants would not he protected necessarily by any of
the present categorical disproportionality rules, nor is an appropri-
ate bright line to cover this situation easy to conceive. A death
sentence imposed on a mercy-killer obviously is not proportionate
just because the Supreme Court has not provided a categorical rule
to cover this situation. This situation requires what occurs in ap-
propriate non-capital cases—a true disproportionality inquiry, based
on all of the circumstances of the case.
if the Supreme Court had envisaged solving the disproportion-
ality problem in capital cases at one time solely by using categorical
rules of preclusion, it obviously has given up this hope in the past
several years. The Court's retreat from the Enmund rule in Tison
does not stand alone but should be read together with the Court's
refusal to erect a categorical barrier to the execution of the mentally
retarded in Penry and its decision to allow the execution of some
juveniles in Stanford. Like Penny and Stanford, Tison is not a decision
to,create a new categorical rule but a decision to reject the adoption
of, or, in the case of Tison, the continuation of, a specific rule.
Neither Stanford nor Penny hold that a death sentence for a 16-
year-old, or mentally retarded, defendant is necessarily proportion-
ate under the eighth amendment. In both cases, the Court carefully
phrased its denial of the rule sought by holding that the factor,
mental retardation or age, was not alone sufficient to render the
death penalty disproportionate. 2 "
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976).
2" See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185 (Ha. 1986); State v. Forrest, 321 N.C. 186,
362 S.E.2d 252 (1987); and see generally D. HUMPHREY & A. WICKET r, THE RIGHT To DIE
(1986); Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN.
L. KEv. 969 (1958); Note, Slate v. Forrest: Mercy Killing and Malice In North Carolina, 66 N.C.L.
REv. 1160, 1168-70 (1988).
212 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
213
 In Penry, Justice O'Connor reasoned that those who are mentally retarded are not a
homogenous group, but rather, they can vary greatly in abilities and understanding. Thus,
she concluded:
1 cannot conclude that all mentally retarded people or Penry's ability—by virtue
of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any individualized consider-
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Tison should be read the same way. Simply because a court can
say that a defendant was recklessly indifferent does not mean that
a death penalty is not grossly disproportionate under the eighth
amendment. Only by considering all of the factors in a case can a
court make this decision.
In the felony murder area, this type of case-specific review
might be largely redundant, at least for accomplices, if the Enmund
categorical rule was still the law. Although a rare case might raise
this issue, it is difficult to conceive of a disproportionality problem
in a case where the defendant intentionally commits a dangerous
felony and intends that a life be taken during this felony. The broad
rule of Enmund, however, no longer exists as a rule of law. Tison
now governs and, particularly if the Bullock limitation of federal
review is held to apply, it does little to obviate the need for a case-
specific disproportionality review for Felony murder accomplices.
This case-specific disproportionality review would differ only
slightly from the procedure previously used by the Supreme Court
to determine the appropriateness of a requested categorical rule.
Although the court would have to examine a broader range of
circumstances than if a categorical rule were being invoked, a court
responding to such a challenge would, like the Supreme Court has
in the past, have to make its own determination of the issue after
seeking guidance from objective factors.'"
Perhaps the greatest change in case-specific disproportionality
review would have to come in the court's consideration of legislative
at ion of their personal responsibility—inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional,
and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death
penalty. Mentally retarded persons are individuals whose abilities and experi-
ences can vary greatly . . . [Wle cannot conclude today that the Eighth
Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Peury's
ability simply by virtue of their mental retardation alone.
109 S. Ct. 2934, 2957-58 (1989) (emphasis added). The 'Jewry Court did not hold that a
death penalty imposed on Mr. Penry, or any other retarded person, is not grossly dispro-
portionate under the totality of the circumstances.
Similarly, in considering the death penally for a 16 year old, the Supreme Court held
that before a rule could be adopted making all juveniles ineligible for the death penalty, it
must be shown, "nut that 17 or 18 is the age at which most persons, or even almost all
persons. achieve sufficient maturity to be held fully responsible fur murder; but that [7 or
18 is the age before which no one can reasonably be held fully responsible." Stanford v.
Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2978-79 (1989). Thus, for both youthful defendants and mentally
retarded persons, the Court has left open the possibility that the sentence can be found
grossly disproportionate under a totality of the circumstances approach.
214
 For a discussion of how the Court conducts a review for disproportionality, see supra
notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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enactments. Although decisions in other cases can provide some
guidance in a case-specific challenge (assuming that there are
enough similar cases), this guidance is not available with legislative
enactments. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurrence
in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 215 legislative enactments that permit a
death penalty for a given defendant do not necessarily demonstrate
a legislative choice that the defendant in question should die—they
instead may indicate that a legislature simply has not considered
the question. 21 " In fact, the latter is the only reasonable conclusion
when one is considering the possible disproportionality of a sen-
tence under a totality of circumstances approach.
The Court. has examined legislative enactments to determine if
the legislatures, as representatives of the American people, approve
or disapprove of the death penalty in question. This examination
may be of use when the Court looks to the determinative effect of
a single factor but it is totally inappropriate under a totality of
circumstances approach. It is probable that the legislatures did in-
tend to include most felony murderers and deliberate murderers
among those who are eligible for execution. In some cases, however,
such as the 16-year-old, mildly retarded felony murderer, or a
mercy killer, it would be absurd to say that a legislature has chosen
deliberately to include these defendants among those to be exe-
cuted. Rather, it would be far more accurate to say that the legis-
lative enactments are simply not relevant to a court's determination
of disproportionality because the legislators in all probability did
not even consider the death penalty under such circumstances.
In sum, it is clear that there is a compelling need for courts to
develop a jurisprudence of effective case-specific disproportionality
review not only for a felony murder accomplice but for any capital
defendant. As broad as they are, the categorical rules are clearly
insufficient to guarantee the quest for proportionality that is at the
heart of the Court's entire eighth amendment venture. Perhaps the
inadequacy of the bright-line approach was inevitable, but the
Court's recent reluctance to create or continue categorical rules has
magnified greatly the need for a meaningful alternative. 2 ' 7
108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988),
2 '" Id. at 2707 (O'Connor,., concurring).
2" Some state courts have used their non-constitutional comparative review procedures
to invalidate death penalties in felony murder cases. See, e.g., Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396
(Fla. 1987); Caruthers v. State, 465 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1985); Rembert v. State, 445 So. 2d 337 •
(Fla. 1984); State v. Bensen, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
There are two easy ways to resolve the contradictions between
the felony murder rule and the dictates of the eighth amendment
in capital cases. One would be to abolish the felony murder rule.
The other would be to limit it to non-capital cases. The courts and
the legislatures have shown no inclination to do either.
The courts, of course, could ignore the contradictions and
could allow the execution of even the least culpable felony murder
accomplices while many cold-blooded deliberate killers are allowed
to live. To do so, however, would contradict the Supreme Court's
entire effort to provide some rationality in our choice of who is to
die. The Supreme Court's continual return to these cases indicates
that the justices are acutely aware of the problems caused by the
persistence of the felony murder rule. This rule alone can take a
defendant and place him on death row alongside the most heinous
of killers whereas, without the rule, he or she may not even be
guilty of any form of homicide.
This article has made two suggestions: first, eliminate the use
of felony murder as a narrowing device when the defendant's con-
viction is predicated on felony murder; and second, conduct case-
specific proportionality review in felony murder capital cases. Both
suggestions are rooted in the existing eighth amendment jurispru-
dence, and, if adopted, should help eliminate the problems caused
by the continuing vitality of the felony murder rule in the age of
eighth amendment capital punishment.
A proper application of the eighth amendment narrowing re-
quirement in felony murder cases, together with the entire edifice
of procedural protections required by the Court in capital cases,
would minimize the chance that a demonstrably undeserving felony
murder defendant would receive the death penalty. History and
common sense teach us, however, that some of these defendants
inevitably will be sentenced to death.
The statistics cited in Enmund are still valid—few felony mur-
derers who did not intend to kill are ever sentenced to death. 21 s Yet
21 " See 458 U.S. 782, 794-95 (1982) (discussing rarity or such executions and death
sentences)„tiee also Note, supra note 37. at 102 (discussing statistics on cases between Enmund
and Timm). On jury leniency For accomplices in Felony murder cases, see Dressler, The
Jurisprudence of Death by Another: Accessories and Capital Punishment, 51 U. Coto. L. Ku. 17,
67-72 (1979): Note, The Constitutionality of imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15
Hous. L. REV. 356, 375 (1978).
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the question after Tison is: for which of these defendants will a
death penalty be grossly disproportionate under the eighth amend-
ment? With no bright-line rule in effect, the court can answer this
question only by conducting an intense scrutiny of all of the circum-
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